The Story of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts: A Retrospective by Krishnan, Jayanth K
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Books by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2018
The Story of the Dubai International Financial
Centre Courts: A Retrospective
Jayanth K. Krishnan
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, jkrishna@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks
Part of the Courts Commons, International Business Commons, and the International Law
Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Books by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Krishnan, Jayanth K., "The Story of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts: A Retrospective" (2018). Books by Maurer
Faculty. 199.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/199
‘This book combines a historical narrative with the 
insight of  a distinguished legal academic, written 
in a readable style which will make an excellent 
read as well as providing an authoritative history 
of  the first decade of  the DIFC Courts.’
– Dr Michael Hwang
Chief  Justice of  the DIFC Courts 
(2010–2018)
‘Since the 1990s, international commercial arbitration 
has been de rigueur in the resolution of  cross-border 
commercial disputes. International commercial  
arbitration, however, has become procedurally 
complicated, costly and has encountered difficulties 
in recovering the assets of  responding parties  
outside the seat of  arbitration. For these reasons, 
there is a new player in international commercial  
dispute resolution: international commercial 
courts in the form of  the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts. Whereas the 
Commercial Court in London has, for some time, 
resolved international commercial disputes, the 
DIFC Courts break new ground in the establishment 
of  such institutions. How does an Arabic-speaking 
religious monarchy establish an English-language 
court that uses English common law procedural 
rules to attract international business to Dubai, 
the financial “hub” of  the Middle East? In this 
fascinating account, Professor Jayanth Krishnan 
skilfully describes the story of  the DIFC Courts. 
Positioning the DIFC Courts in the literature on 
law and globalisation, he explains the remarkable 
collaborations that lead to its founding, the  
legislative and regulatory mechanics that  
facilitated the DIFC Courts’ operation, how the 
DIFC Courts function within the UAE judicial 
hierarchy, and the jurisdictional innovations of 
the DIFC Courts. Professor Krishnan further 
discusses recent challenges to the DIFC Courts 
and pushback from the onshore courts, illustrating 
that the role of  the state has hardly been erased in 
economic and legal globalisation. At once detailed 
and accessible, this chronicle, which will be of 
wide interest to a number of  audiences including 
practitioners and academics, blazes exciting paths  
in the study of  international dispute resolution in  
the most unlikely of  places.’
– Associate Professor Matthew Erie
University of  Oxford
Can Western-based, English-speaking, common law 
commercial courts operate successfully in an environment 
that are not their own—such as in the Middle East? This 
question is not a simple thought experiment but rather 
the reality that has occurred since the mid-2000s in the 
Emirate of  Dubai. This exciting book tells the remarkable 
history of  how the ‘Dubai International Financial Centre 
Courts’ emerged. Drawing on extensive interviews with 
key stakeholders involved in the process, along with rich 
original documents as well as all of  the Courts’ judgments, 
this first-of-its type narrative offers important lessons 
for those seeking to understand more fully the complex 
interplay of  how law, legal institutions and legal and 
political actors operate in today’s globalised world.
Jayanth Krishnan is the Milt and Judi Stewart Professor  
of  Law at Indiana University Bloomington Maurer 
School of  Law. He is also the Director of  the Stewart 
Center on the Global Legal Profession at Indiana.  
He is the author of  numerous publications on the legal 
profession, comparative courts, legal education, and 
globalisation and the law, a sample of  which have been 
published by the California Law Review, Harvard Human 
Rights Journal, Texas Law Review, Law and Social Inquiry, 
and the Annual Review of  Law and Social Science. Krishnan  
is the co-editor of  a Cambridge University Press book  
on law and religion, and other works of  his have 
appeared in volumes published by Cambridge and 
Stanford University Press. He is also the recipient of 
Indiana University Bloomington’s Trustees Teaching 
Award and the Leon Wallace Teaching Award, which  
is the highest such honour at the Maurer School of  Law. 
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T H E  S TO RY  O F  
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL  
FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
‘We can be proud that Professor Krishnan has  
followed his authoritative study of  the Dubai World 
Tribunal with this comprehensive and highly readable 
account of  the DIFC Courts from their inception in 
2005 to their prominent international position today. 
Rightly he pays tribute to the vision of  those who 
have brought this about, and he will inspire those 
who take it forward in future.’
– Sir Anthony Evans
Founding Chief  Justice of  the DIFC Courts
‘Professor Krishnan weaves together insights gleaned 
from interviews with key players and case law to tell 
a compelling story of  the creation and development 
of  the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) 
Courts. All too often we assume courts to be static 
institutions. But the DIFC Courts have evolved over 
time to take a more expansive, but not unlimited, 
position regarding their jurisdiction. Much as their  
creators anticipated, foreign investors have come to 
rely on these courts. They have also assumed a  
critical role in the local legal landscape, complementing 
the Dubai Commercial Courts. Professor Krishnan’s 
analysis ought to be equally appealing to practitioners 
and scholars, making the book essential reading for 
both groups.’ 
– Professor Kathryn Hendley 
William Voss-Bascom Professor of  Law 
and Political Science at the University 
of  Wisconsin-Madison
‘This very well presented book offers a unique and 
thorough, yet concise, account of  the history of  the 
DIFC Courts through its first decade. The book 
explores the evolution of  the DIFC Courts from 
their initial conservative approach to a bolder stance 
which helped them to integrate into the existing 
Dubai and UAE judicial system, as well as having 
their judgments recognised and enforced on a global 
scale. Of  course there have been, and remain, tensions 
and challenges that exist for the DIFC Courts and 
Professor Krishnan also offers insight into those in 
his very readable style. Overall, Professor Krishnan’s 
narrative of  the DIFC Courts provides us with an 
important reminder of  their significance as one of  
the key pillars of  Dubai’s legal system today.’
– Essam Al Tamimi
Founding Partner of  Al Tamimi & Company
 
‘In this impressive study of  law and globalisation, 
Professor Krishnan provides a panoramic perspective 
on the origins and early evolution of  the Dubai 
International Financial Center Courts. He skillfully 
shows the court’s early achievements and its looming 
challenges, as the UAE continues the process of 
constructing the critical legal infrastructure for 
an economy and society in transition. This deeply 
empirical and interdisciplinary book is sociolegal  
scholarship at its finest.’ 
– Professor Ajay K. Mehrotra
Executive Director and Research Professor 
at the American Bar Foundation, 
Professor of  Law and History at the 
Northwestern University
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This monograph would not have been possible without the support of  a 
number of  people. First, I wish to thank the DIFC Courts’ personnel for 
the time they gave to me and for providing me with access to cases, articles, 
and other literature and materials that were invaluable for this study. In 
addition, the staff, lawyers, and justices who sat with me to teach me about 
how the judicial process works at the DIFC were absolutely instrumental for 
my understanding of  this subject. In particular, I would like to thank Chief 
Justice Michael Hwang, Sir Anthony Evans, Deputy Chief  Justice Sir David 
Steel, Sir John Chadwick, Justice Roger Giles, Justice Judith Prakash, Justice 
Tun Zaki Bin Azmi, Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke, His Excellency Justice Omar 
Juma Al Muhairi and His Excellency Justice Ali Shamis Al Madhani. There 
were others as well who assisted me greatly, including Amna Al Owais, David 
Gallo, Natasha Bakirci, Cheryl Fernandes and Hayley Norton. One person,  
in particular, Mark Beer, deserves special thanks. Mark was an incredibly 
helpful respondent not just for this study, but also for two earlier studies 
that I led—a pilot project on the DIFC Courts in 2014 and another on the 
Dubai World Tribunal in 2016. He was the first to introduce me to how the 
DIFC Courts operate, and without his patience in educating me about this 
institution, none of  my DIFC work could have been completed.
I also need to thank the Dubai government, and particularly the Dubai 
Courts, for their kind assistance in providing me access to data, literature, 
personnel and their facilities during my time in Dubai. I appreciate the 
government’s willingness to welcome me to the local Dubai Courts, and 
everyone with whom I met there was generous with their time.
In addition, I am grateful to the number of  lawyers who I interviewed for 
this project. Each of  them provided me with thoughtful assessments on their 
perceptions of  the DIFC Courts, and how, more broadly, globalisation has 
influenced Dubai’s hopes to be one of  the world’s leading commercial hubs. 
 
I am also appreciative of  the support I received from my deans at Indiana 
University-Bloomington’s Maurer School of  Law: Austen Parrish, Donna 
Nagy, and Christiana Ochoa. I wish to thank my colleague at our IU Stewart 
Center on the Global Legal Profession, Lara Gose. Priya Purhoit and Harold 
Koster were important colleagues and co-authors, respectively, on my two 
previous Dubai-based projects. I also appreciate the research assistance that 
was provided to me by Vitor Dias, Anirudh Konda Reddy, Ali Van Cleef,  
and Alyssa Gerstner. 
Finally, I wish to thank Motivate Publishing, which had the aspiration of 
publishing an independent research assessment of  the DIFC Courts at this 
momentous time in the Emirate’s history, and specifically, Charlie Scott and 
Aswathy Sathish, who were instrumental as my editors. The publisher funded 
this project and gave me complete academic freedom to write what hopefully 
will be seen as a fair, rigorous, and comprehensive assessment. I am grateful  
for having this opportunity. 
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Twenty years ago, the government of  Dubai made 
a decision that would forever alter its future. In 
1998, the ruling family announced that it wanted 
to transform the Dubai economy into one of  the 
world’s leading financial centres.1 The plan was, 
in a sense, audacious. True, Dubai had resources 
and capital, and its leaders had the will to make 
this initiative a reality. Furthermore, within the 
Arab Middle East, Dubai was seen as an oasis by 
many foreigners who did not view the Emirate with 
the same trepidations as they did other potential 
competitors. If  any place in the region could 
be the new global hub for trade, business and 
economic development, surely Dubai stood at  
the top of  the list.
At the same time, however, there were certain  
facts that could not be ignored, especially by 
foreign investors. For one thing, the local language  
of  Arabic was one that most investors from 
Europe, the United States and Asia did not speak. 
There was also the reality that these investors 
were unfamiliar with the local culture of  Dubai. 
Consider, for example, that although Sharia law 
was ‘relegated to a secondary role,’2 it still had 
an important presence in the daily life of  those 
living in the Emirate. In addition, while Dubai was 
culturally more progressive than other Arab cities, 
it retained a more traditional milieu where social 
practices that existed in the West simply were not 
permitted by the Emirate’s authorities. 
Yet, there was another looming issue that worried 
foreign investors during this period in the late 
1990s. Dubai’s legal system, these investors feared, 
was not equipped to handle the complexities 
of  cross-border, international commercial 
transactions. The local courts were run in Arabic 
and followed a civil law system that had not 
encountered the types of  legal matters that were 
inevitably to come, if  Dubai began the economic 
liberalisation process. To the government’s credit, 
it recognised these deficiencies as well. Between 
1998 and 2003 it sought the counsel of  two elite 
London-based law firms, Clifford Chance and 
Allen & Overy. The purpose was to determine 
what the government needed to do—in terms of 
legal infrastructure—in order to make Dubai an 
attractive place for foreign investment.3 
Ultimately, in 2004 the federal government of  the 
United Arab Emirates authorised Dubai to pass 
Law No. 9, which created a global, cosmopolitan 
business campus. The DIFC—or Dubai 
International Financial Centre—was established 
in order to attract foreign investment and to make 
the Emirate an international hub for commercial 
transactions. The government restated its objective 
but now with greater clarity: to promote Dubai’s 
geographic position in the Gulf  as a significant 
strategic advantage for international investors—a 
gateway bridging those working in South and East 
Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and the 
Western Hemisphere.4
I N T RO D U C T I O N
Dubai’s Law No. 9 outlined that there were to be 
three components to the DIFC: (a) an authorising 
agency that would be the regulatory body overseeing 
employment law, corporate law, commercial law, 
and real estate; (b) a regulatory agency that would 
oversee all financial matters involving the DIFC; 
and, most interestingly, (c) a set of  common-law 
courts. For the first several years, the DIFC Courts 
served as the adjudicatory forum for all commercial 
disputes within the DIFC. In 2011, following 
the passage of Law No. 16, the DIFC Courts 
additionally were granted jurisdiction over any 
commercial matter (domestic or international) so 
long as all parties gave consent.5
Since that time, Dubai’s government leaders have 
promoted the DIFC Courts with great enthusiasm. 
Western common law and Western legal principles 
are used, as is English, in order to make the 
DIFC Courts accessible to global professionals. 
Furthermore, the judges of  the DIFC Courts 
(on both the Court of  First Instance and Court 
of  Appeal) are internationally respected. (The 
current Chief  Justice is Dr Michael Hwang, an 
Oxford-educated Singaporean lawyer who headed 
the litigation and arbitration department of  the 
firm Allen & Gledhill.) The goal is to have the 
DIFC Courts be efficient, just, and legitimate.  
They are to serve as an accessible Western-style 
judicial system within this Arab-Gulf  monarchy. 
Indeed, the arrangement of  the DIFC Courts 
within the UAE is just another example of  how 
globalisation is reconfiguring the relationship 
between legal institutions and political systems  
in the twenty-first century.6
***
The focus of  this book is on the DIFC Courts  
and how they have operated since coming into 
existence. There will be an examination of 
the reception the Courts have received both 
domestically and internationally, as well as how 
effective they have been in delivering adequate  
legal remedies, as seen by those who have 
participated in the process. The underlying 
question that this book asks is whether a Western- 
style, common law judiciary can be exported  
to a country such as the UAE. 
The answer, this book argues, is yes. Although, 
as will also be discussed (and as the various 
stakeholders realise), constant vigilance is required 
in order to ensure that such courts remain 
independent. Moreover, as the end of  this story 
reveals, the DIFC Courts are facing particular 
challenges of  which they have not seen to-date. 
And as this book goes to press, it is uncertain as  
to what the outcome of  this situation will be. 
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The emergence of  the DIFC Courts adds another 
layer to the broader scholarly discourse on 
how law and legal actors operate in this era of 
globalisation. Mark Massoud has surveyed the 
literature, concentrating specifically on how such 
states procure foreign investment and ensure 
to investors that there will be judicial fairness, 
reliability, efficiency, and predictability.7 Massoud 
describes governments inviting investment from 
abroad by embracing foreign legal practices, such 
as international arbitration, within its borders. 
Others have also conducted parallel research.8
For example, scholars focusing on Africa, Asia 
and Latin America have demonstrated the ways 
in which governments use judicial institutions 
to maintain control, to govern, and to enhance 
political capital.9 Simultaneously, these studies 
show that judiciaries can, at times, also serve as 
institutional outlets for those aggrieved by their 
respective regimes.10 A separate wave of  scholarship 
focuses not so much on courts but on the actions 
of  legal professionals in such systems. Dezalay 
and Garth’s work on rights lawyering during 
transitional times in Latin America argues that 
such legal activity shaped, and was shaped by, state 
policy.11 Meili’s research, also on Latin America, 
shows that social justice lawyering ironically was 
able to thrive in non-democratic periods and 
declined during transitions.12 Michelson’s studies on 
civil and criminal lawyers in China, however, are 
more cautious—demonstrating that occasionally 
these lawyers are able to make modest social 
justice strides, but that more frequently, success 
at navigating the legal system depends upon: 
how embedded the lawyers are within the state 
apparatus, the political nature of  the issue, and 
guanxi, or the networks and connections of  the 
lawyers themselves.13
Perhaps the most relevant set of  works that apply 
to this study involve those that have examined 
the personal and conflicting emotions of  lawyers 
and judges seeking to operate within globalising 
societies. Often such professionals ‘face an 
intractable dilemma’.14 On the one hand, they can 
be viewed as a potential challenge to the existing 
order. At the same time, they may be susceptible 
to unwanted pressure. Additionally, these legal 
professionals can be seen as potential saviours or 
as people who can bring about legitimacy and 
prosperity to a society. Yet, when they are unable 
to meet these high expectations, which is not 
uncommon, they quickly see their social capital 
diminished as well as their effectiveness.15 Failing 
to live up to the many pressures and demands by 
various stakeholders can take an emotional toll 
on this group, leading them to scale back their 
involvement in the development of  the society and 
even to question their own professional relevance.
The scholarship described above leads to a 
question that has a clear tension within it: How 
can state leaders who wish to attract foreign 
capital yet lack a history of  providing judicial 
services for foreign investors, strengthen their legal 
infrastructure, while not altering the character and 
sovereignty of  their society? With the introduction 
of  the DIFC Courts, Dubai has affirmatively 
and boldly introduced American and British-style 
common-law courts into its mainstream judiciary. 
Since its first sitting in 2005, the DIFC Courts 
have seen their docket grow and their impact on 
international commercial law disputes increase. 
As this book will demonstrate, this experiment has 
been an overall success, mainly because of  the 
cooperation between the Dubai government and 
the foreign actors involved.
Concomitantly, however, there have been 
unexpected ramifications of  this decision to 
establish the DIFC Courts. The purpose of  this 
book, therefore, is to provide a comprehensive 
and nuanced assessment of  this institution. 
While the Courts have been in operation now 
for thirteen years, this year—2018—serves as a 
significant milestone. Ten years ago, Sir Anthony 
Evans, the DIFC Courts’ inaugural Chief  Justice, 
gave a speech where he noted that 2008 marked 
the first time that the Courts had a complete 
panel of  judges, a full-time registrar to oversee 
administrative operations, a finalised set of 
rules outlining the parameters of  the Courts’ 
authority, and an official courtroom and offices.16 
It thus seems appropriate to provide a careful 
retrospective—a full decade on—regarding how 
the Courts have fared, noting the accomplishments, 
challenges and critiques they have faced.
F I T T I N G  T H I S  P RO J E C T 
I N T O  T H E  L A RG E R  
B O D Y  O F  R E L E VA N T  
L I T E R A T U R E
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The presentation of  this book spans across the 
next four chapters. Chapter One will provide a 
history on how the DIFC Courts emerged. There 
will be a discussion of  relationships that were 
forged between Dubai’s government leaders and 
the foreign lawyers and judges who were primarily 
from Britain. In addition, Chapter One will describe 
the organisation of  the DIFC Courts, as well as 
their workload over the years and the manner in 
which their jurisdiction has expanded. Finally, 
peppered throughout this chapter will be brief 
biographies of  the main figures who were involved  
in the formation of  the Courts themselves. 
Chapters Two and Three will then turn to the 
matters that the DIFC Courts faced in the early 
and subsequent years of  operation. The issues 
here revolved around whether judgments delivered 
by the Courts would be enforceable, and to what 
extent their jurisdiction and authority would be 
respected within Dubai and internationally. Also 
consider that the emergence of  the DIFC Courts 
onto the dispute resolution scene posed a challenge 
to an established practice in which many foreign 
and domestic commercial lawyers working in Dubai 
engaged: arbitration. The Courts argued that their 
venue was cheaper, more efficient, and had as 
adjudicators some of  the most globally renowned 
judges in the world. Why, therefore, would clients opt 
for arbitration when the DIFC Courts were a better 
alternative to resolve disputes? These two chapters 
set forth the ensuing debate between the advocates 
championing the DIFC Courts’ effectiveness 
and those who were more sceptical, along with 
providing an analysis of  a subsequent development 
that occurred in 2016. As the discussion highlights 
overall, the rebuttals and evidence offered by the 
Courts’ supporters eventually fended-off  the serious 
assertions from the critics.17
Finally, the Conclusion examines the implications 
of  importing a Western-style, common law 
judiciary into states that are seeking to enhance 
their global market presence but which have not 
had past experience with such courts. Dubai, of 
course, voluntarily and affirmatively adopted the 
DIFC Courts into its jurisdiction. The government 
accepted the proposition that foreign investors 
should have a choice in the legal systems under 
which they work. Yet, certain tensions have now 
arisen, and additionally, other questions have 
emerged, including whether the DIFC Courts need  
to remain primarily staffed by judges from abroad. 
Initially, the response by the Courts’ framers was 
yes—that foreign judges were a prerequisite if 
international investors were to have confidence in 
Dubai. But for how long will the Courts continue 
to operate in this manner is now a question more 
frequently being discussed.
 
Furthermore, is this DIFC Court-experience only 
applicable to the Dubai context? Can it, and the 
lessons from this experiment, be exportable to 
other jurisdictions? And what are the broader 
consequences of  incorporating foreign laws 
and a foreign judicial system into a sovereign 
country? Answering these questions will be of 
immense importance for scholars, lawyers, judges, 
investors, clients and policymakers who are eager 
to understand how best to transition an economy 
from one that is local or regional to one that is 
global. As this book will argue, having a stable and 
predictable rule of  law system firmly in place is  
essential for facilitating such a successful transition.18
O U T L I N E  O F  
T H E  C H A P T E R S
THE STORY OF THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS Introduction
09
The data collection for this study occurred in two 
waves. During the summer of  2014, I was granted 
permission to spend time with personnel and the 
head registrar of  the DIFC Courts. Through these 
interviews and interactions, I learned first-hand 
how this institution functioned. Also, because a 
certain number of  cases from the DIFC Courts 
are published online, these matters were analysed 
in order to understand the types of  issues heard, 
parties involved and rulings rendered.
In addition, in 2014 I interviewed twenty-six  
experienced commercial lawyers from across  
the seventy international law firms located in  
Dubai, in order to gauge their views on the DIFC 
Courts.20 Interviews were also conducted with 
local Dubai Emirati lawyers who work in this  
field and with in-house lawyers from different 
multinational corporations. Also, I spent time in 
the two other major competing dispute resolution 
settings for commercial matters—the local Dubai 
District Court and the Dubai International  
Arbitration Centre (DIAC), the latter being a 
forum established under the auspices of  the Dubai 
Chamber of  Commerce and Industry (DCCI). 
Interviews were conducted with officials from  
each of  these respective institutions.21
While an initial pilot study was issued in 2014,22 
in the fall of  2017, I returned to take stock of  the 
DIFC Courts since that publication—especially 
given the passage of  Decree 19 in 2016. A second 
round of  in-depth interviews were conducted 
during this phase of  the research, including with 
eight past and present judges from the DIFC 
Courts. (Currently, there are a total of  ten judges 
sitting on the bench.) Also as part of  this second 
wave were interviews with: (a) the staff  of  the 
DIFC Courts, many of  whom I met in 2014,  
(b) lawyers who I met with in 2014, (c) a new set  
of  lawyers, and (d) government policymakers. And 
in November of  2017, I was invited to a major 
annual function hosted by the DIFC’s Academy 
of  Law, where more than 700 of  Dubai’s most 
influential lawyers, judges, corporate leaders, 
clients and state officials were present. During 
this several-hour affair, I had the opportunity to 
interview attendees who spoke candidly about 
their sentiments towards the DIFC Courts. 
Along with the collection of  this primary sourced 
material, I also relied on the minimal secondary 
sources that exist on the DIFC Courts and dispute 
resolution in Dubai. In particular, I performed 
content analysis of  newspaper accounts, practitioner 
and bar-journal reports, and the few scholarly 
pieces that make mention of  these issues. In sum, 
relying on multiple methods of  inquiry provided 
me with a fuller picture of  how the DIFC Courts have 
fared and are perceived, in comparison to the other 
competing institutions that exist within the Emirate.
Finally, I should mention that this book will not be 
focusing on the Dubai World Tribunal (DWT), which 
was a separate institution that emerged out of  the 
DIFC following the global financial recession of 
2008 and 2009. The DWT’s panel of  adjudicators 
came from the DIFC Courts, and the tribunal’s  
physical facility was the same as the courtroom used 
by the DIFC Courts. But the DWT was a unique 
forum that occurred at a unique moment in Dubai’s 
history, and it was established primarily to deal with 
insolvency proceedings against a government  
corporation known as ‘Dubai World’. In 2016, 
Harold Koster and I published a detailed article on 
the DWT and how this judicial tribunal functioned, 
as well as how its jurisdiction expanded beyond what 
was originally conceived by the decree’s drafters.  
(The paper appeared in the Journal of  Dispute Resolution.)23 
That the DWT involved the same personnel and 
infrastructure as the DIFC Courts and adopted 
a Western legal framework (here, key aspects of 
American and English insolvency laws) to guide  
it, certainly is evidence of  the DIFC Courts’ positive 
reputation, particularly among government officials. 
However, the evolution of  the DIFC Courts is its own 
story. Especially in light of  the recent developments 
since 2016, it deserves its own independent treatment. 
For that reason, the work of  the DWT will not 
be repeated during the telling of  the DIFC Courts 
account—the narrative which we turn to next.
A  W O R D  A B O U T  
M E T H O D O L O G Y 19
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In early November 2017, I was granted a two-day 
interview to meet the founding Chief  Justice of 
the DIFC Courts, Sir Anthony Evans. Sir Anthony, 
as he is known, provided an historical account of 
how he was appointed to this inaugural posting, as 
well as the details of  how the DIFC Courts came  
to be.1 Born in 1934, Sir Anthony was educated 
at St. John’s College, Cambridge, receiving three  
degrees (BA, MA and LLM) between 1957 and 
1960.2 He was called to the bar (Gray’s Inn) in 
1958, named a Queen’s Counsel in 1971, and 
proceeded to serve as a judge in England and 
Wales, first on the High Court in 1984 and then 
on the Court of  Appeal beginning in 1992, for 
eight years. Before his time on the bench, Sir 
Anthony established himself  as a highly reputed 
maritime and commercial barrister for twenty-
six years, beginning in 1958. And in addition 
to his work in this area, he was also an engaged 
arbitration lawyer, ‘including [participating 
in] two major ICC [International Chamber of 
Commerce] arbitrations’3 in Paris between 1982 
and 1984.4
As it was discussed in the Introduction, and as  
Sir Anthony explained, the idea for creating the 
DIFC complex emerged during the late 1990s. It 
was not until a few years later, however, where 
plans for the Courts began to gain steam. One 
of  the key people in this process with whom Sir 
Anthony worked was Dr Omar bin Sulaiman, a 
well-known business executive who was recruited 
to the DIFC in 2004 with the expectation of 
transforming the Centre into a first-rate global 
financial complex.5 According to Sir Anthony,  
‘Dr Omar was [significantly] responsible for 
developing and establishing the Courts.’6 The reason 
was because Dr Omar was pivotal in securing 
funding for the infrastructure of  the DIFC, including 
the building that would eventually house the 
judiciary itself.
Dr Omar’s initial appointment (2004–2006) was 
as the Director General of  the DIFC Authority 
(DIFCA), a statutory body tasked ‘to oversee the 
strategic development, operational management 
and administration of  [the] Dubai International 
Financial Centre.’7
Dr Omar had the task of  consolidating personnel  
and raising the reputation of  the DIFC so the 
international-investor community could have 
confidence and assurance that the Emirate, and 
particularly the Centre, was a safe place to do 
business. As part of  this process, he recognised 
that having an unimpeachable judiciary was  
crucial. Accordingly, recruiting top global talent  
to be part of  the DIFC Courts became a priority.
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Sir Anthony, in particular, had visited Dubai in 
2003, when, at the time, there was no commercial 
campus but instead ‘only sand and construction’.8 
He officially took up his post the following year 
upon the appointment by Dubai’s then ruler, the 
late Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum.9  
As Sir Anthony remarked at a ceremony some 
years later regarding Dr Omar and the Emirati 
officials who brought him to the DIFC:
‘[they] enabled us to open these magnificent court 
premises as early as April 2007. I should also place 
on record that they and the Government of  Dubai  
at all times have scrupulously observed the principles 
of  judicial independence and the constitutional 
concept of  the separation of  powers. The Courts 
are truly independent, and I express my gratitude 
to them. This has made it possible for us to live up 
to the ancient Arabic inscription which reads, in 
translation, “do not be afraid to ask for justice.” 
The English equivalent “Access to Justice” is  
more prosaic.’10  
There were other key appointments made early 
on as well. For example, the DIFC Courts’ first 
Consultant Registrar was John Watherston, a 
decorated Commander of  the British Empire 
(CBE), who had served as the Registrar of  the 
United Kingdom’s Judicial Committee of  the 
Privy Council until his retirement there in 2005. 
Sir Anthony lauded Watherston’s contributions; 
however because Watherston was not a UAE 
resident and thus was present only part-time,  
the Courts needed an on-the-ground person  
to coordinate their day-to-day activities. Sunita 
Johar aptly served in this role as Acting Registrar, 
and together she and Watherston facilitated the 
Courts’ operation in those early years.11
A significant move made by this pair was to 
bring aboard savvy Emirati staff, particularly the 
hiring of  Amna Al Owais in 2006. Al Owais was 
a key addition because she had been a respected 
domestic lawyer with a prestigious law firm and 
before that had worked in the Ministry of  Justice, 
practising in the local and federal UAE courts.12 
Additionally, she had earned an LLM in international 
commercial law from Kingston University in the 
UK. Al Owais and her colleagues recognised the 
importance of  respecting and working closely with 
the local population. If  the Courts were to succeed 
as an international hub for resolving commercial 
disputes, there had to be domestic ‘buy-in’.
For the DIFC team, executing on this philosophy 
meant developing close ties with the local Dubai 
courts who were led then by Director General  
Dr Ahmed Bin Hazeem as well as with the Ruler’s 
Court, and specifically its leader since 2008, His 
Excellency Mohammed Al Shaibani. Notably,  
because they each believed that a globalised and 
globally accepted judiciary was essential for  
Dubai’s long-term economic growth, both officials 
embraced—rather than felt threatened by—the 
DIFC Courts. Dr Bin Hazeem, for example, 
strongly supported the addition of  what became 
known as the ‘opt-in’ feature of  the judiciary 
in 2011, which allowed for any party to select 
the DIFC Courts as the venue for resolving 
disputes.13 Similarly, the DIFC Courts received the 
imprimatur of  HE Mohammed Al Shaibani,  
which was critical given that his institution serves 
as the ‘higher supervision and coordination body 
between all government departments in Dubai’.14
Furthermore, the DIFC team also built bonds 
with the Government of  Dubai’s Legal Affairs 
Department (LAD), which opened in 2008 and  
was headed by Director General Dr Lowai 
Belhoul.15 Established under Dubai Law No. 32, the 
LAD is arguably one of  the most critical  
agencies in the Emirate that has as its mandate 
several key regulatory functions. For instance, it is  
in charge of  advising, representing, and defending 
the government in lawsuits. It also oversees 
the legal profession in the country by licensing 
domestic lawyers and foreign legal consultants. 
The LAD offers training programs to legal 
professionals, along with publishing legal research 
and opinions on matters affecting the government. 
In the past it drafted model legislation and 
regulations, and significantly for this study, 
today it ‘supervises all legal matters concerning 
the Government of  Dubai,’16 including the DIFC 
Courts. That officials from the LAD fully  
supported the DIFC Courts’ mission indicated their 
global vision as well as the deep ties that were 
forged between themselves and their counterparts 
from the Centre. As Dr Lowai stated in an  
interview from some time back:
‘... the regulatory framework for the legal  
profession in Dubai is still developing, and is very 
much in a nascent stage. The intention of  the  
Department is to gradually introduce regulations 
in order to build a robust regulatory regime based 
on sound and internationally tried and tested best 
practices with similar professional obligations, 
standards and requirements as may be found in 
other jurisdictions.’17
Therefore, for promoters of  the DIFC Courts, 
having this domestic support was indispensable. 
In fact, between 2005 and 2009, the work of  the 
Courts continued steadily, mainly because of  a 
number of  critical steps put into place by the  
Dubai government. For example, to demonstrate 
its commitment to seeing the Courts start as 
soon as possible and to ensure confidence among 
attuned international investors, the government 
authorised the judiciary to hold its first sitting as 
early as October of  2005. Even though a dedicated 
courthouse building had yet to be constructed, two 
earlier-mentioned jurists, Sir Anthony and Justice 
Michael Hwang from Singapore, began hearing  
cases.18 (Justice Hwang initially served as Deputy 
Chief  Justice and then became Chief  Justice in 
2010 and will be of  central focus in Chapter Three.)
Indeed, from 2005 until 2008, Sir Anthony and 
Justice Hwang were the only two judges to hear 
cases at the Court of  First Instance and Court  
of  Appeal levels—a further indication of  the 
government’s desire to showcase to the world the 
independence and international bona fides of  
the DIFC Courts. It was not until 2008, when 
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more cases started to enter the Courts, that the 
number of  judges was increased. Two Emiratis—
Justices Ali Al Madhani and Omar Al Muhairi—
and a Malaysian, Justice Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Siti 
Norma Yaakob (the first woman on the DIFC 
bench and the first female judge in the UAE) were 
sworn into office. (Note: Justices Omar and Ali were 
Senior Judicial Officers before their appointment, 
and they played an important role in establishing 
the Courts from the early days. In addition, they 
had obtained common law degrees at the School 
of  Oriental and African Studies in London.)19  
Also that year, three other foreign judges became 
members: Sir Anthony Colman, Sir John Chadwick 
and David Williams QC. As the brief  biographies 
at the end of  this chapter reveal, each of  these new 
appointees brought with them their own social 
capital, which only helped further strengthen the 
reputation of  the DIFC Courts as an institution. 
In addition, upon the urging of  people like Sir  
Anthony Evans (as well as lawyers from those 
UK firms representing the Dubai government), two 
prominent English barristers—Michael Black, QC 
and Tom Montagu Smith—had been brought in 
to finalise the rules of  the DIFC Courts. This 
procedural framework was based primarily on the 
rules of  the UK’s Commercial Court, and it was 
embraced by the Dubai government, mainly due  
to how respected these rules were held in the 
eyes of  practitioners around the globe. (The rules 
are divided into fifty-six parts and are available on the 
Courts’ website, https://www.difccourts.ae/court-rules/.) 
Furthermore, defining the tenets for how the 
Courts should operate—procedurally, substantively 
and jurisdictionally—gave a formality and 
‘official-ness’ to the institution. Moreover, the 
Courts adopted a sophisticated technological 
system, allowing lawyers, parties and even, where 
necessary, judges to be ‘virtual’ and to be ‘beamed 
in from’ outside of  the Emirate, were they not 
available to be in Dubai. Such a situation thereby 
enabled the government to make the case that the 
DIFC Courts were accessible, reliable, and ready- 
to-go at a moment’s notice if, for example, an 
‘urgent application [needed to] be made’ by  
a claimant or defendant.20
Perhaps the last important piece put into place, 
administratively, during these early years occurred  
in 2008 with the naming of  Mark Beer as the  
judiciary’s full-time, Dubai-based Registrar. In 
many ways Beer’s appointment helped further 
elevate the global presence, power and prestige  
of  the DIFC Courts. Beer was an Oxford-trained 
lawyer and former Vice President and Legal 
Counsel at MasterCard Corporation. (Before 
MasterCard, he worked as a commercial lawyer 
for the law firm of  Clyde & Company and prior 
to that with the firm of  Edge & Ellison.) Over 
the years, Beer’s reputation within the legal and 
business community—among both those supportive 
of  the DIFC Courts and those who have had 
questions—has been stellar. He is thought of  as 
brilliant, honest, charismatic, and eloquent, and 
someone who is seen as having boundless, optimistic 
energy. His work on behalf  of  the DIFC Courts 
has earned him the prestigious Officer of  the Most 
Honourable Order of  the British Empire Award in 
2013 from the Queen of  England.21 Sir Anthony  
too has sung his praises, noting how:
‘I cannot even begin to say how fortunate the 
Courts were to recruit him or to describe the 
efficiency and above all the vision and flair he 
has brought to the office of  Registrar. Under 
his leadership the Courts’ staff  has become an 
effective team, and he is a powerful ambassador 
for the Courts in Dubai and the UAE and 
internationally. Allow me a nautical metaphor—
his talents are now in full flood, and I simply 
commend him for what he has done and what he 
will certainly achieve in the future.’22
To reiterate, these developments that began in 
2005 highlight a government that was determined 
and enthusiastic about opening a new, global  
judiciary that would be functional and seen as 
legitimate by the commercial-investor world.  
The strong bonds that developed between the 
Courts and domestic officials proved to be  
especially vital beginning in the spring of  2009. 
That year, Dr Omar departed from his post,  
which caused some initial concerns. However, 
there proved to be no direct, negative impact on 
the Courts, namely because successive Governors 
were (and have since been) supportive of  the 
vision, mission, and work of  the institution. The 
philosophy was that stability was needed in order 
to assure investors that the DIFC was going to be 
strong and long-standing and be based on a rule 
of  law template that was recognised and respected. 
Having cooperation between involved foreign  
and domestic officials, a sophisticated staff, and  
first-rate infrastructure, as well as English 
commercial law as its framework, allowed the 
DIFC the best opportunity to continue reaching 
for this objective.23 
 
***
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There is also a Court of  Appeal that hears matters 
‘filed against judgments and awards made by the 
Court of  First Instance.’27 This appellate body 
may also provide an ‘interpretation of  any article 
of  the DIFC’s laws based upon the request of  any 
of  the DIFC’s bodies or the request of  any of  the 
DIFC’s establishments ...’28 The Court of  Appeal 
is the court of  last resort within the DIFC; it has 
discretionary jurisdiction and sits in panels of  at 
least three judges (whereas the Court of  First  
Instance has single-judge benches).29
An ancillary arm of  the DIFC courts is the Small 
Claims Tribunal (SCT), which was created in 2007. 
This forum is intended to deal with cases of  relatively 
smaller monetary value.30 Currently, there are 
seven eligible DIFC Courts’ staff  members who 
can sit as tribunal adjudicators, although only one 
official is needed per bench to hear cases.31 The 
jurisdiction of  the SCT is that it hears cases where 
the monetary value ‘does not exceed AED 500,000 
or ... where the claim relates to the employment 
or former employment of  a party; and all parties 
elect in writing that it be heard by the SCT.’32 (In 
this latter situation there is no ‘value limit for the 
SCT’s elective jurisdiction in the context of  
employment claims.’)33
Al Owais, who today has risen to become an SCT 
judge and the current Registrar of  the DIFC 
Courts, explained in a recent interview that since 
2015 the Tribunal has heard over 200 cases per 
year.34 In fact, the proudest achievement of  the 
SCT, as she noted, was that approximately 90 per 
cent of  all cases brought to it settle within four 
weeks of  being filed.35 Furthermore, the SCT 
operates as a ‘smart-court’, where the technology 
that it possesses allows parties to access the  
proceedings remotely, thereby further facilitating 
the resolution of  disputes in a timely fashion.36
Alongside the SCT, there is an important pro bono 
programme involving staff  and external volunteer 
lawyers who counsel financially needy clients on 
issues related to the DIFC. Initiated as a pilot 
project in 2009, in 2012 it evolved into a full pro 
bono clinic with DIFC Courts’ staff  seeking advice 
from lawyers and judges from different parts of 
the world on how best to provide this service.37  
In 2014, there was a revamping of  the framework 
under which the pro bono program functioned. 
This point will be further discussed in the concluding 
chapter, but briefly, through passage of  Dubai  
Law No. 7 the programme was placed under 
a newly created body known as the Dispute 
Resolution Authority (DRA). In fact, the scope  
of  the DRA, as we will see, has been much 
broader than administering pro bono services.  
The DRA reconfigured the entire governance 
structure of  the DIFC judicial system, and it 
remains in place to this day.38
T H E  O RG A N I S A T I O N 
A N D  W O R K L O A D  O F  
T H E  D I F C  C O U RT S 
Established in 1971, the UAE has a constitution 
that is federal in nature and allows for a special 
judicial configuration.24 There is a unified, tiered 
federal judiciary that has at its apex a Federal  
Supreme Court. However, Dubai was permitted  
to opt-out of  this system and thus has its own set 
of  courts: ‘a Court of  Cassation, Court of  Appeal 
and Court First Instance.’25 Given this backdrop, 
it is perhaps not surprising that a parallel court 
system could emerge in Dubai. As discussed,  
there are two levels to the DIFC Courts. There is  
a Court of  First Instance that has jurisdiction over: 
‘1. Civil or commercial cases and disputes  
involving the DIFC, any of  the DIFC’s bodies  
or any of  the DIFC’s establishments.
2. Civil or commercial cases and disputes arising 
from or related to a contract that has been  
fulfilled or a transaction that has been carried out,  
in whole or in part, in the DIFC or an incident 
that has occurred in the DIFC. 
3. Objections filed against a decision made by the 
DIFC’s bodies, which are subject to objection in 
accordance with the DIFC’s laws and regulations. 
4. Any application over which the Courts have 
jurisdiction in accordance with the DIFC’s laws 
and regulations. 
5. Any civil or commercial claims or actions where 
the parties agree in writing to file such claim or 
action with it whether before or after the dispute 
arises, provided that such agreement is made  
pursuant to specific, clear and express provisions.’26 
(This last point was added in 2011.)
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Finally, during the earlier-mentioned pilot study, 
Mark Beer stated that from its inception until 
2014, the DIFC judiciary had heard approximately 
600 cases ‘across the various courts ranging from 
significant and complex cross-border commercial 
disputes to property disputes and employment 
disputes.’39 Beer noted that in the Court of  First 
Instance, where the most complex of  cases are 
heard, on average 92 per cent are settled before 
trial. (A good percentage of  the other cases were 
heard in the private Small Claims Tribunal or in 
arbitration-related litigation, which the Courts 
treat as confidential.)
 
Breaking down the analysis a bit further, consider 
that in examining the first three years of  the Courts’ 
docket (2005–2007), on the publicly searchable 
DIFC website there are only ten judicial orders and 
three judgments available, even though the Courts 
heard more matters than these figures indicate. 
Again, the reason, according to officials, is because 
often a case has been settled without the need 
for a determination, or alternatively, a judgment 
has been given extempore. Similarly, over the 
last three years (2015–2017), there have been on 
average approximately 200 cases heard per year  
by the SCT, forty to fifty cases heard per year by 
the Court of  First Instance, and roughly ten cases 
heard per annum by the Court of  Appeal. Yet again, 
the number of  final judgments that are shown 
on the Courts’ website from the Court of  First 
Instance and the Court of  Appeal is low because 
of  the high settlement rate of  the cases.40 
As to the judges who have heard these matters, the 
final section of  this chapter provides annotations 
of  the corps of  adjudicators who have sat alongside, 
or subsequent to, Sir Anthony. (Sir Anthony 
retired from the bench in 2010, and because a 
description of  his background was provided above, 
his biography is not included here). Furthermore, 
from the outset judges were recruited from common 
law countries who would also be familiar with the 
operation of  the Commercial Court in London, 
given that it served as the key institutional influence 
on the DIFC Courts.41 As the discussion below 
demonstrates, this cadre has been highly talented, 
sophisticated, and diverse—geographically,  
educationally, and professionally. 
* * *
A B R I D G E D  B I O G R A P H I E S 
O F  T H E  D I F C  C O U RT 
J U S T I C E S :  2 0 0 5 – 2 0 1 7 
C U R R E N T  C H I E F  J U S T I C E 
M I C H A E L  H W A N G 
H I S  E X C E L L E N C Y  J U S T I C E  A L I 
S H A M I S  A L  M A D H A N I 
The biographies are listed chronologically 
and then alphabetically.
He was the first Deputy Chief  Justice of  the DIFC 
Courts beginning in 2005. Born in Australia, he 
was educated at Oxford, served as a partner at 
the Singaporean firm of  Allen & Gledhill, and 
became Chief  Justice of  the DIFC Courts in 2010, 
upon the retirement of  Sir Anthony. In Singapore, 
Chief  Justice Hwang is a Senior Counsel (the 
Singaporean equivalent of  Queen’s Counsel) 
who practises as an international arbitrator with 
a selective practice as Counsel. He has served 
as President of  the Law Society of  Singapore 
(2008–2010), a faculty member at the University 
of  Sydney and a part-time Visiting (and later 
Adjunct) Professor at the National University 
of  Singapore as well as a senior office holder or 
member of  numerous international arbitration 
committees, including the International Council 
for Commercial Arbitration, the International Bar 
Association’s Arbitration Committee, the London 
Court of  International Arbitration, and the  
Permanent Court of  Arbitration at The Hague. 
The Chief  Justice is set to retire in 2018.42 
He was appointed to the DIFC Courts in January 
of  2008. He serves as a judge on the SCT, Court 
of  First Instance, and Court of  Appeal. He has 
had experience in the local Dubai judiciary, first 
as a Public Prosecutor (1994–1998) and then as a 
judge in the local Dubai courts beginning in 1998. 
Justice Ali attended the School of  Oriental and 
African Studies (London) and has also been highly 
involved in the International Association for  
Court Administration, where he presently is the 
Chair for the Middle East Board for Courts  
Administration.43 
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L A T E  D E P U T Y  C H I E F  J U S T I C E  
S I R  A N T H O N Y  C O L M A N 
H I S  E X C E L L E N C Y  J U S T I C E  
O M A R  J U M A  A L  M U H A I R I 
R E T I R E D  J U S T I C E  TA N  S R I  D A T O ’ 
S E R I  S I T I  N O R M A  YA A K O B 
R E T I R E D  D E P U T Y  C H I E F  
J U S T I C E  S I R  J O H N  C H A D W I C K 
He was appointed to the DIFC Courts in 2008  
and as Deputy Chief  Justice from 2010 until 2013.  
He served on the Courts till his retirement in 
2013. From 1992 until 2007, Sir Anthony was a 
judge on the English Commercial Court in London. 
After studying law at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, he 
was called to the bar (Gray’s Inn) in 1962 where 
he practiced as a barrister and then subsequently 
as a Queen’s Counsel, primarily in the areas of 
commercial and business law and arbitration.  
Sir Anthony passed away on 27 July 2017.46 
He was appointed in 2008 to the DIFC Courts  
as a judge on the Court of  First Instance and 
Court of  Appeal. However, his tenure at the  
DIFC began in 2005 as a Senior Judicial Officer.  
Identical to Justice Ali, Justice Omar began his  
career as a Public Prosecutor in 1994 followed 
by an appointment as a judge on the local Dubai 
courts in 1998. Additionally, Justice Omar spent 
two years studying law at the School of  Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS) in London.44
She was the first female appointed judge of  the 
DIFC Courts in 2008. Malaysian by nationality, 
she studied law in London and was called to the 
bar (Gray’s Inn) in 1962. In 2005, she was the first 
woman to be appointed as Chief  Judge of  Malaya. 
She has held many positions during her long legal 
career, including President of  the Sessions Court 
in Kuala Lumpur, Senior Federal Counsel in the 
Attorney General’s Chambers in Kuala Lumpur, 
Judge on the High Court of  Malaya, Judge on the 
Federal Court of  Malaya, and currently she is the 
Pro-Chancellor of  the University of  Malaya. She 
retired from the DIFC Courts in 2013.47
He was appointed in 2008 to the DIFC Courts as 
a judge on the Court of  First Instance and Court 
of  Appeal. Prior to joining the DIFC, he served on 
the Court of  Appeal for England and Wales from 
1997–2007 and before that appointment he was a 
judge on the Chancery Division of  the High Court 
in England from 1991–1997. While as a judge on 
the DIFC Courts, Sir John also simultaneously 
presided as President of  the Court of  Appeal of 
the Cayman Islands from 2008 until November 
2015. As a practitioner, Sir John was called to 
the bar in 1966 (Inner Temple) and became a 
Queen’s Counsel in 1980; his main practice areas 
were in the fields of  commercial and business law 
and matters relating to insolvency. He served as 
Deputy Chief  Justice of  the DIFC Courts from 
2013 until 2016 when he retired.45
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H I S  E X C E L L E N C Y  J U S T I C E  
S H A M L A N  A L  S A W A L E H I 
R E T I R E D  J U S T I C E  
S I R  D AV I D  W I L L I A M S 
J U S T I C E  T U N  Z A K I  A Z M I D E P U T Y  C H I E F  J U S T I C E  
S I R  D AV I D  S T E E L 
He was first appointed to the Court of  First 
Instance in 2014 to hear interlocutory applications 
and was promoted in 2017 to be a full member 
of  the Court of  First Instance and the Court of 
Appeal. He is a law graduate (with distinction) of 
the UAE University, and he also holds a master’s 
degree (with merit) from Westminster University 
in the UK. His first introduction to the DIFC 
Courts was as a judicial officer in 2010, where 
he subsequently became a SCT judge. Justice 
Shamlan also holds an advanced diploma from  
the Dubai Judicial Institution.50 
He was appointed to the DIFC Courts in 2007 
and retired in 2013. He is a prominent commercial 
lawyer in New Zealand and keeps chambers at 
Bankside (Auckland, New Zealand), Maxwell 
(Singapore) and Essex Court (London). He 
received his LLB from the University of  Auckland 
and his LLM from Harvard, and then he practiced 
as a litigator at the firm of  Russell McVeagh 
McKenzie Bartleet & Co, Auckland from 1969–
1984. He became a barrister at law in 1985 and 
subsequently a Queen’s Counsel in 1987. Justice 
Williams served on the High Court of  New 
Zealand from 1991–1994 and has also served as 
Chief  Justice (and later President) of  the Court  
of  Appeal of  the Cook Islands Courts.48 
He was appointed to the DIFC courts in 2013 and 
serves on both the Court of  First Instance and the 
Court of  Appeal. He is a former Chief  Justice of 
Malaysia, serving from 2008 until 2011. Prior to 
this appointment he was a Federal Court Judge 
and then President of  the Malaysian Court of  
Appeal. Justice Zaki Azmi was called to the bar  
in London in 1969 (Lincoln’s Inn) and then 
returned to practice law in Malaysia, working 
in both the public and private sectors, until his 
appointment onto the federal bench.51 
He was appointed to the DIFC Courts in 2011 
and since 2016 he has served as the Deputy Chief 
Justice. He was called to the bar in 1966 and then 
practiced commercial law from 1968 until 1998. 
From 1998 until 2011 he served as a judge in the 
Commercial and Admiralty Courts in London,  
and he was also chairman of  the European  
Commercial Judges Forum from 2009 until 2011. 
Sir David also has an international reputation 
as an admiralty judge, and he holds a master’s 
degree from Oxford University and he has been 
both a barrister and Queen’s Counsel, as well as 
a Bencher of  the Inner Temple (1995) and head 
of  chambers at 2/4 Essex Court (1995–1998). He 
retired as Deputy Chief  Justice in May 2018 upon 
reaching the statutory retirement age of  75.49 
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He was appointed to the DIFC Courts (on 
both the Court of  First Instance and Court of 
Appeal) in 2016. He holds a First Class Degree 
in Jurisprudence from the University of  Oxford 
where he studied from 1967–1970. From 1971–
1973 he articled with Speechly, Mumford and 
Soames, was admitted as a solicitor in 1973, and 
thereafter practiced general and commercial 
litigation for three years at Coward Chance. Sir 
Jeremy then was called to the bar (Lincoln’s Inn) 
in 1976. He also has engaged in extensive work 
as an arbitration lawyer. And he has served as a 
judge, first on the High Court (Queen’s Bench 
Division), which began in 2001, and then in 
2003 he was named to the Commercial Court in 
England and was as Judge in Charge there from 
2012 to 2013.54 
He was appointed to the DIFC Courts (on 
both the Court of  First Instance and Court of 
Appeal) in 2014. Australian by nationality, he 
holds degrees from Sydney and Oxford, and prior 
to his time with the DIFC, he was a judge on the 
Supreme Court of  New South Wales beginning in 
1988, then rising to become Chief  Judge of  that 
court’s commercial division in 1994. From 1998 
until 2011, Justice Giles was a member of  Australia’s 
Court of  Appeal. Prior to his judicial experience, he 
was called to the bar of  New South Wales in 1971 
and was a long-time practitioner of  business and 
commercial law.52 
A national of  Singapore, she was appointed to the 
DIFC Courts (on both the Court of  First Instance 
and Court of  Appeal) in 2017. She currently also 
sits as a Judge of  Appeal on the Supreme Court of 
Singapore, to which she was appointed in 2016. 
Justice Prakash first entered the Singaporean 
judiciary in 1992 as a judicial commissioner, and 
thereafter she was named as a judge in 1995. She 
is a 1974 graduate (with first class honours) from 
the University of  Singapore, and she practised 
business, shipping, and commercial law in the 
private sector as an advocate and solicitor before 
entering the judiciary.55 
He was appointed to the DIFC Courts (on 
both the Court of  First Instance and the Court 
of  Appeal) in 2015. He is a graduate of  the 
University of  Bristol where he earned his LLB 
and the London School of  Economics where he 
received his LLM. British by nationality, he was 
called to the bar in 1977 and became a Queen’s 
Counsel in 1987. Prior to joining the DIFC, 
he was a judge on the High Court in England 
(Commercial Court Division) from 2002 until 
2014. Between 2008 and 2012, he served on 
the Western Circuit and became the Judge in 
Charge of  the Commercial Court in 2014. As 
a practitioner, Sir Richard was a distinguished 
lawyer of  commercial law and an experienced 
arbitrator who has had significant experience in 
the fields of  international trade, banking, and 
commodities.53 
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C H A P T E R  T W O
DIFC Judgments and the Debate Over Enforceability:  
Jurisprudence and the Challenges in the Early Years
Based on my review of  the available case law, 
along with media searches, interviews with  
lawyers, claimants and court personnel, the below 
section provides a brief  survey of  those major  
rulings by the Court of  First Instance and Court 
of  Appeal since the DIFC’s founding. (An important 
note to emphasise: the discussion of  the case law 
in this chapter, for the most part, stays clear of  
the DIFC Courts’ decisions on arbitral awards  
and their recognition and enforcement. That 
material and a detailed analysis are saved for 
Chapter Three.) 
Following this discussion, there is then a shift 
in focus—from a doctrinal examination to one 
that early on involved a question that many 
interested observers were asking: to what extent 
are judgments from the DIFC Courts actually 
enforceable? As we will see, the debate over 
this issue has been of  major significance to the 
stakeholders who participated—or have considered 
participating—in this novel experiment.
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The first set of  leading judgments by the DIFC 
Courts illustrates an institution that was 
contemplating how best to situate itself  within 
its new environment. Several of  the cases the 
judiciary heard initially dealt with questions 
relating to conflict of  laws, jurisdiction, 
regulations, banking, employment law and 
enforcement of  judgments. In fact, in this first 
era of  significant decisions, these issues often 
overlapped in the cases that came before  
the judges. 
For example, consider the 2009 Rasmala Investments 
Limited case.1 That matter centred on an 
employment dispute with a group of  claimants 
arguing that they had been unfairly dismissed 
by the Rasmala company. The claimants sought 
compensation for this dismissal in the SCT. The 
Tribunal applied UAE Labour Law to provide 
three months of  compensation for the termination, 
even though there existed the DIFC Employment 
Law of  2005 that governed this relationship— 
but offered no such remedy.
The case was appealed to the Court of  First  
Instance and heard by Justice Tan Sri Siti  
Norma Yaakob. Two years prior, the Court of 
First Instance, with then Deputy Chief  Justice  
Michael Hwang presiding, was asked by liquidators 
in a case known as Forsyth, to use either UAE 
law or English law to determine how best to 
prioritise outstanding debt claims.2 Justice Hwang 
refused and instead applied the governing DIFC 
Insolvency Law, which did not provide for such 
prioritising.3 Basing her ruling on Forsyth, Justice 
Tan Sri Siti Norma Yaakob stated that the 
claimants here similarly could not ‘contract out of 
the DIFC Law ... and resort to relying on a right 
that is present’4 elsewhere. In Rasmala, the DIFC 
Employment Law also referenced regulations that 
could be issued to cover unfair dismissal cases, 
but the DIFC Authority had not enacted such 
supplementary regulations at the time of  the case. 
And Justice Tan Sri Siti NormaYaakob was  
unwilling to impute the UAE’s (non-DIFC) Labour 
Law in this case. As such, the SCT judgment  
was overturned.5
S U M M A R I S I N G  K E Y  
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Other decisions during this first era highlight  
a similar sensitivity. Take the interesting case 
involving the law firm, Denton Wilde Sapte 
(DWS).6 We will return to this case in Chapter 
Three, but briefly, here, the claimant, Injazat 
Technology Fund (ITF), sued the firm contending 
that the lawyers did not represent them adequately 
and ‘negligently failed to advise ITF in regard to 
the existence or exercise of  the option’7 it had, 
whereby it could request that third-party  
guarantors of  a financing deal ‘repurchase all 
of  ITF’s shares for 125 per cent of  the amount 
actually invested,’8 if  the terms of  the original 
contract had not been met. DWS argued that its 
agreement with ITF mandated that any dispute 
between the parties be handled by arbitration 
in front of  the London Court of  International 
Arbitration (LCIA), and thereby moved to dismiss 
ITF’s case. Justice Sir David Steel, however,  
declined DWS’s motion.9 
Following the rationale of  both Forsyth and  
Rasmala, Justice Steel strictly applied the DIFC’s 
Arbitration Law No. 1 of  2008, which he stated 
required that the case be able to proceed.10 For 
Justice Steel, his options were limited, and so he 
followed the law as he was obliged to do, noting  
at the close of  his opinion, ‘I would have granted 
a stay if  there were jurisdiction to do so.’11  
(As Chapter Three discusses, a subsequent Court 
of  First Instance case written by Justice David  
Williams, known as Al Fattan,12 chose not to  
follow this decision in favour of  a more arbitration 
friendly approach. The difference between the  
two cases was finally settled in the direction of  
Al Fattan by an amendment to the Arbitration  
Law in 2013 where it was decided that the Courts 
could ‘stay proceedings in favour of  an agreement  
to arbitrate, irrespective of  what seat, if  any, is 
stated in the agreement.’)13
Forsyth, Rasmala and DWS each illustrate the  
DIFC Courts employing a very literal method of 
interpreting DIFC laws and questions relating to 
jurisdiction. However, in what might be viewed as 
‘jurisdictional creep’, there was a subtle change in 
approach in 2011 with a Court of  Appeal decision 
in National Bonds Corporation PJSC v Taaleem PJSC 
and Deyaar Development PJSC.14 This case involved a 
Murabaha—or a type of  loan that allows a ‘straw’  
or middle person to procure title to property  
without any encumbrances. In the agreement  
between the parties, there was a clause (section 
14.1) stating that disputes would be settled within 
the ‘courts of  Dubai.’ The Court of  Appeal held 
that reference to such courts could necessarily 
include the DIFC Courts. To hold otherwise, the 
Court concluded, would denigrate the status of 
the DIFC Courts and go against the government’s 
intent when it created this institution.15 
In sum, through 2011 it would be fair to suggest that the 
DIFC Courts, for the most part, adhered strictly to their 
mandate and jurisdictional domain. The next section  
examines how the case law evolved in what might be 
seen at the ‘Second Era’ of  DIFC Courts’ jurisprudence.
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On 12 January 2012, the DIFC Court of  Appeal 
issued a significant ruling in a case called Corinth 
Pipeworks SA v Barclays Bank PLC.17 The matter  
involved a Greek steel company, Corinth, which 
had sold its products to an Emirati company located 
in Jebel Ali, Dubai. The Emirati company owed 
Corinth some USD 24 million, and it had used 
Barclays Bank to hold its assets. After not  
receiving payment from the buyer or having the 
money transferred from Barclays to it, Corinth 
sued alleging that both parties conspired against it 
and engaged in fraud and false representation.18
The case was presented to the DIFC Court of 
First Instance, with the late Deputy Chief  Justice 
Sir Anthony Colman presiding. Justice Colman 
dismissed Corinth’s claim for lack of  jurisdiction. 
In referencing Article 5(A) of  Dubai Law No. 
12 of  2004, he stated that because the actions 
between Corinth and the buyer and Barclays 
occurred outside of  the DIFC, his Court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear this case. Deputy Chief 
Justice Colman pointed to the statute, which 
said that to fall under the jurisdiction of  a DIFC 
Court, a party had to be a ‘Centre Establishment.’ 
And for Deputy Chief  Justice Colman, a Centre 
Establishment exists ‘only to the extent to which 
its branch is authorised to conduct business in and 
from the DIFC[,] and [that] a claim or dispute 
only “involves” a Centre’s Establishment when that 
claim or dispute is connected with or arises out of 
the activities of  the corporation conducted by its 
DIFC branch or division.’19
On appeal, however, this decision was reversed. 
The Court of  Appeal found that even though the 
dispute occurred in Jebel Ali, because Barclays 
had a branch within the DIFC, the Courts could 
entertain the matter. Chief  Justice Hwang,  
writing for the Court, stated ‘that an unincorporated 
DIFC branch of  a foreign bank cannot be regarded as 
an independent entity. ... Accordingly, the DIFC 
Courts do have jurisdiction over the conduct of 
the Respondent’s Dubai branch, as it would have 
over any other branch of  the Respondent,  
wherever located.’20 (Note, there was a caveat that 
such claim to jurisdiction would be subject  
to the restraints of  the doctrine of  forum  
non conveniens.)
Corinth set the stage for the DIFC Courts to begin 
taking a more expansive role. In addition, the  
passage of  an important amendment, Dubai Law 
No. 16 of  2011, also enhanced the Courts’ jurisdiction. 
As one report noted, the ‘law allow[ed] parties 
anywhere in the world, regardless of  whether they 
have any ostensible connection to the DIFC, to opt 
in to the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction in the context 
of  civil and commercial matters.’21 It took a bit of 
time for this law to have an effect, but eventually 
the Court of  First Instance and the Court of 
Appeal saw a noticeable rise in the number of 
matters on their dockets. During 2015 and 2016, 
for example, the Court of  First Instance and 
Court of  Appeal heard a total of  108 cases. (The 
former heard thirty-nine and forty-seven cases 
each year, respectively, and the latter had nine and 
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thirteen cases on its docket, respectively.)22
Given this increase in the caseload, a confidence took 
place within the DIFC Courts, and the judges did not 
miss this opportunity to leave their mark. For instance, 
the Court of  Appeal reheard the above-mentioned, 
National Bonds Corporations case, but this time on a  
different issue. In the subsequent matter, the Court 
ruled that it had the authority to interpret what it 
called the ‘Sharia Standards’ provided within the 
existing Murabaha agreement.23 For the first time the 
‘case serve[d] to highlight that the DIFC Courts may 
also be used as a forum for litigation in applications 
involving Islamic banking and related services.’24  
The Court of  Appeal in Fidel v Felecia ventured 
further. Since the foreign judges of  the DIFC were 
internationally renowned and had years of  expertise 
in multiple jurisdictions, the Court ruled that even 
in matters involving UAE law alone, so long as one 
of  the three judges on the appellate bench was an 
Emirati, it had the competency to adjudicate without 
needing to adhere to the classic English procedure  
of  relying on external experts for insight.25 
Two other significant cases during this second era 
also showed a judiciary that was willing to assert its 
strength. In Investment Group Private Ltd v Standard  
Chartered Bank, the Court of  Appeal importantly  
rejected a party’s motion to have this case removed  
to another jurisdiction (namely, to the Emirate of 
Sharjah). The Court opined that the DIFC’s  
judiciary was every bit as equivalent and capable  
as the domestic UAE courts to hear the matter.26  
Extending this argument beyond the UAE’s border, 
the Court similarly held in 2016, that so long as a 
competing court—here, a court in Saudi Arabia—was 
not any more competent in adjudicating on an issue, 
then the DIFC’s Courts had no reason to decline 
hearing the case on forum non conveniens grounds.27
But the issue most salient during the 2015–2016 
term revolved around how foreign judgments 
would be treated. It is important to note that there 
is a difference between the enforcement of  foreign 
judgments, which is addressed in this chapter, and 
foreign arbitral awards, which will be the focus 
of  Chapter Three. Regarding the former, in what 
has come to be known as the pivotal DNB Bank 
case, the Court of  Appeal was confronted with a 
straightforward question: to what extent could it 
recognise and thereafter seek to enforce a foreign 
judgment?28 DNB had argued that an English 
court judgment it had received should be seen as 
legitimate and enforceable within the DIFC. The 
Court of  Appeal agreed with this position, as well 
as with DNB’s follow-up argument that such an 
affirmation would make the English ruling ‘no longer 
be a “recognised foreign judgment” but would simply 
be a “judgment” within the meaning of  Article 7(2) 
of  the [Dubai] JAL [Judicial Authority Law], thus 
available for referral to and enforcement by the Dubai 
Courts.’29 This willingness to serve as a ‘conduit’30 to 
the domestic bench marked a significant proclamation 
by the DIFC Courts that it was taking its raison d’etre to 
heart—namely that the Courts existed in order to 
promote and facilitate international commercial  
activity within the Emirate.
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the Federal Court of Australia and Chief Justice 
Michael Hwang SC of the DIFC Courts sign a 
Memorandum of Guidance in 2014.
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It would not be unreasonable to assert that the 
Court in DNB Bank felt empowered because of 
what had happened thousands of  miles away in  
a courtroom in Australia. In 2014, the DIFC’s 
Court of  First Instance ruled in favour of  a 
claimant in the case of  Graciela Ltd v Giacobbe.31 
Here, the claimant had argued that the defendant 
had damaged the former’s information technology 
system. Because of  where the defendant’s assets 
were located, the claimant sought to enforce the 
judgment in the New South Wales Supreme Court. 
The decision to approach the Australian court 
was based on a Memorandum of  Guidance signed 
between it and the DIFC Courts. Although non-
binding, the agreement set out clear procedures 
for recognition and enforcement. To the great 
delight of  not just the prevailing party but also 
to those at the DIFC Courts, the Australian court 
adhered to these principles and affirmed and 
enforced the Court of  First Instance’s ruling.32 
These developments highlight what we might see 
as the two-way internationalisation of  the DIFC 
Courts. On the one hand, the judges were keen 
to provide their counterparts abroad—as well as 
well as foreign lawyers and foreign parties—the 
assurance that Dubai and the DIFC Courts were 
open, fair, transparent and globally attuned to the 
norms and practises of  the international commercial  
community. At the same time, in order to have 
global legitimacy, it was vital that the Courts’ 
rulings would be seen as valid—abroad. The 
events that occurred regarding the Graciela Ltd  
case were a major step forward in this direction. 
A series of  important decisions were handed-down by 
the DIFC Courts in 2017. In several of  these matters, 
the cases had started some years prior, with initial 
judgments rendered—only then to have the same  
parties return to the Courts for subsequent hearings 
on other issues. For example, the Standard Chartered 
case reappeared on the Court of  First Instance’s  
docket. This time, the issue involved whether the 
defendant, Investment Group Private Limited, which 
had taken a loan from Standard Chartered, could 
restructure or set-off  its debt because of  its inability 
to pay. The Court of  First Instance refused to  
acquiesce and ‘granted [Standard Chartered] an  
immediate judgment.’33 The noteworthy aspect  
of  this ruling was its tone. As Deputy Chief  Justice  
Sir David Steel stated:
‘The lengthy reference to the chronology of 
these proceedings supports the clear view that 
I have formed that IGPL [the defendant] had 
expended an enormous amount of  time and 
money to disrupt and delay the proceedings. 
Those efforts have included the pursuit of  a 
wide range of  misconceived propositions of  law. 
The determination to avoid the resolution of 
the claim leads to the clearest inference in my 
judgment that to the knowledge of  IGPL the 
defence and counterclaim lack any credibility.’34
There were other important cases that the Courts 
encountered during the 2017 term. In DIFC  
Investments LLC v Mohammad Akbar Mohammad Zia, 
the claimant argued that the defendant’s failure  
to pay on the sale of  seventy-two properties  
necessarily voided the entire deal. The Court  
of  First Instance agreed and terminated the  
contract, per the claimant’s request.35 In Theron  
Entertainment LLC v MAG Financial Services, the 
Court of  First Instance ruled against a defendant 
for failing to live-up to the contractual obligations 
in a lease agreement. Per the Court’s order, the 
claimant was permitted to terminate the lease.36
The Court of  First Instance was active in another 
contracts-related matter as well. In an intriguing case 
involving how the legal term ‘consideration’ ought 
to be defined, the Court held that the meaning could 
extend to good will and positive reputation rather 
than the exchange of  actual money.37 In this case, the 
claimant argued that he transferred 10 million shares 
to the defendant in consideration for USD 10 million. 
Curiously, at a later moment, the claimant’s company 
hired the defendant as its chairman. The defendant 
then argued that his acceptance of  this leadership 
position entitled him to the aforementioned 10 million 
shares, and that the consideration was the ‘providing 
[of] his name and contacts to the company, as well 
as his ability to raise funds.’38 Because of  the lack 
of  any convincing evidence from the claimant to the 
contrary, Justice Ali, who was presiding, stated that he 
was ‘persuaded by the Defendant’s argument that the 
actual consideration for the shares was intended to be 
his involvement in the Claimant company; [and] that 
his name and efforts would be used to increase the 
number of  customers and investors for the Claimant.’39 
Accordingly, he dismissed the complaint.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the issues of  jurisdiction 
and enforcement emerged in two cases during the 
2017 term as well. In Barclays Bank PLC et al. v 
Essar Global Fund Ltd, the Court of  First Instance 
forcefully stated that the UAE’s Constitution 
would not be violated by having the DIFC Courts 
enforce a foreign judgment within the Emirate.40 
And in Tavira Securities Ltd, the First Instance Court 
dismissed the argument made by the defendant 
that the DIFC Courts were the improper forum to 
allow a claimant to pursue a damages case against 
it. The defendant here argued that, at the time of 
the dispute, the claimant was not a licensed  
establishment within the DIFC; it only became 
licensed after the claim arose and thus the Court, 
it was argued, should have no jurisdiction over the 
matter. In his decision, Justice Sir Richard Field 
rejected the idea that its jurisdictional authority 
could only be triggered ‘if  this [licensing] status 
was achieved prior to the events giving rise to the 
claim.’41 Instead, he took a broader approach, 
finding that the Court could indeed adjudicate  
on this matter regardless of  when the license  
was issued.42 
At the Court of  Appeal level, 2017 proved to  
be an important year as well. In Frontline 
Development Partners Ltd v Asif  Hakim Adil, the 
Court had to decide whether to enforce a 
provision within the DIFC employment statute 
that penalised an employer for delaying severance 
payments to an employee who had been 
terminated.43 The employer, here, argued that 
because there was a dispute as to the amount 
owed, the penalty should be suspended. However, 
the Court disagreed, strictly adhering to the plain 
meaning doctrine in interpreting the statute. If 
there was to be a change to this policy, legislative 
officials—rather than the Court—would need to 
take the lead, according to the judgment.44 In 
analysing this case, the Court’s decision broke 
from how recent cases had been decided and 
resembled the approach used in Forsyth  
and Rasmala.
The Court, similarly, exercised restraint in a 
case involving the Gibson Dunn law firm. In this 
matter, the firm had terminated the employment 
of  Peter Gray, who sought to have the DIFC serve 
as the venue for arbitration. The Court, however, 
in examining the agreement between the parties, 
noted that the language was silent on this point. 
The only reference made was to California, USA, 
possibly serving as the seat for the arbitration. In 
upholding the Court of  First Instance’s decision, 
the Court of  Appeal ruled that, in the absence 
of  precise terms dictating where the arbitration 
should be held, California—and not the DIFC—
should serve as the default jurisdiction.45
And, one of  the most well-known cases of  the  
entire DIFC Courts’ history occurred at the  
Court of  Appeal during the 2017 term. The  
David Haigh-case, as it is known, requires some 
background before discussing the appellate court’s 
ruling. Haigh today is a British lawyer and  
entrepreneur who works in England. However, 
from 2008 until 2014, he served as an investment 
banker and financier in Dubai for GFH Capital.46 
One of  his most noted accomplishments while 
at this company involved Haigh brokering a deal 
whereby GFH acquired an English football club, 
Leeds United, in 2012. Haigh served on the board 
of  Leeds in 2013 and 2014 until the club was 
purchased by the Italian businessman, Massimo 
Cellino.47 
In April of  2014, Haigh resigned from GFH and 
left for England, but he returned to Dubai a month 
later in hopes of  seeking a new opportunity with 
GFH. (According to Haigh, he was lured back 
to Dubai by the above-mentioned lawyer from 
Gibson Dunn, Peter Gray, who had worked with 
officials from GFH. Haigh subsequently brought  
a private claim of  action against this group in 
England on human trafficking grounds, but his 
case was ultimately dismissed.)48 On 18 May 
2014, Haigh was arrested by the Dubai police 
and charged with embezzlement of  USD 6.45 
million. He was accused of  a range of  crimes, 
but they centred on claims that he fraudulently 
manufactured invoices and had GFH pay out the 
expenses of  these deals into accounts that Haigh 
controlled. For fourteen months, Haigh was 
imprisoned awaiting charges. In August 2015, he 
was formally convicted of  financial misappropriation. 
He was sentenced to two years in prison but was 
given credit for time served and was set to be 
released in November 2015. However in November, 
Haigh was charged with ‘cyber-slander’ and  
accused of  verbally abusing officials from GFH. 
The accusation stemmed from tweets he was 
alleged to have made from his Twitter account in 
March 2015, which Haigh denied, saying he was 
in prison then and had no access or ability to  
commit this crime. In March 2016, Haigh was 
acquitted of  the slander charge and thereafter 
returned to Britain after spending a total of 
twenty-two months behind bars.49
Notwithstanding these criminal charges, GFH 
continued to press its civil claim in the DIFC 
Courts for indemnification of  the money it argued 
was lost because of  Haigh’s activity. In November 
2016, the DIFC Court of  First Instance issued an 
immediate judgment in favour of  GFH, finding 
that a trial was not necessary because the evidence 
against Haigh was overwhelming.50 Haigh took 
the case to the Court of  Appeal, which decided, 
in November 2017, that it had a ‘certain element 
of  doubt in [the] granting [of  an] Immediate 
Judgment’51 as the lower court had done. Moreover, 
the Court of  Appeal appeared to acknowledge ‘the 
financial and physical difficulties [that had] allegedly 
befall[en] the Appellant which he contends have 
prevented him from filing a full defence to the 
charges against him.’52 In setting aside the ruling 
below, the Court went on to say ‘that these factors 
are special circumstances which warrant at least a 
further and final opportunity to the Appellant to 
adduce oral evidence in his defence before final 
judgment is rendered by a trial judge.’53 The Court 
remanded the case for trial, which is to begin in 
July 2018. 
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***
The above discussion highlights the evolution 
of  the DIFC Courts’ jurisprudence over the last 
decade. Clearly, the Courts have not been shy to 
tackle difficult issues and to do so boldly. The next 
chapter discusses the most recent development 
that has emerged regarding the DIFC Courts. 
However, before moving to that discussion, the 
early years saw another serious challenge emerge, 
which dealt with whether judgments from the 
DIFC Courts were really, in fact, enforceable.  
The below section addresses this debate.
T H E  E N F O RC E A B I L I T Y 
O F  D I F C  C O U RT S ’  
J U D G M E N T S 
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There are a significant number of  international law 
firms in Dubai, which has a population of  slightly 
over 2 million. The Legal Affairs Department 
of  the Government of  Dubai maintains records 
of  the firms that exist in the Emirate. As of  this 
writing, the link to that site has been down, so 
in order to generate a preliminary list, I used 
multiple sources to triangulate, verify and then 
compile an extensive directory of  my own. 
Appendix A, at the end of  this chapter, lists the 
foreign firms that currently have a presence within 
the Emirate. 
The vast majority of  these foreign firms are from 
Britain and the United States, although there are 
those that come from other places such as  
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, East and South Asia, 
and Continental Europe. The lawyers from these 
foreign firms are permitted to provide advice on 
matters related to international law and on the 
laws of  their home jurisdiction.54 Additionally,  
the UAE allows foreign lawyers to practice  
domestic law, with the only stipulation being that 
to appear as a lawyer in court, the individual must 
be an Emirati national.55 From the outset, the 
objective of  these foreign lawyers entering Dubai 
has been to make money on high-end, transactional 
commercial deals. It is in such situations that  
access to a reliable legal process—one with which 
they are acquainted—is of  key import. The  
question then is whether the DIFC Courts satisfy 
this wish. For many of  these lawyers, the answer 
in the early years of  the DIFC Courts’ operation 
was no.
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Dr Ahmad Saeed bin Hazeem, former Director General of 
the Dubai Courts, discuss cooperation during a visit to the  
DIFC Courts in 2009.
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Initially, the above sentiment stemmed from the 
lawyers’ views that judgments from the DIFC 
Courts were potentially unenforceable outside 
of  the DIFC complex. This concern had three 
layers to it. Consider the first scenario where one 
party is from within the DIFC but the other is 
not—although it is still based in Dubai. Assume 
both parties consent to a case being brought to the 
DIFC Courts and a judgment is rendered against 
the non-DIFC side. If  the losing party’s assets 
are located within the Emirate (but again, outside 
the DIFC), then the prevailing party would need 
to pursue an enforcement action within the local 
Dubai courts. 
Since 2009, there has been a ‘protocol of  
enforcement’ between the DIFC Courts and the 
local Dubai courts. In 2011, this agreement was 
enacted into law by the Emirate.56 The steps for 
enforcement are straightforward. The prevailing 
party must apply for an ‘execution letter’57 from 
the DIFC Courts, which then is sent to the local 
Dubai court. Under Section 7(2) of  the 2011 
statute, the judgment is translated into Arabic. 
Then, provided that the DIFC judge has described 
specifically how the order should be enforced, it 
thereafter becomes a judgment of  the local Dubai 
court. Furthermore, this new Dubai Court ruling  
is deemed ‘final and executory.’58 
While the above procedure appears to be clear and 
simple, there was the notion among some that there 
can be competition between the local bench and 
its DIFC Court counterpart, which might lead to 
varying results.59 
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A second concern by international lawyers  
related to enforcing DIFC Court judgments in 
other Emirates within the UAE—particularly  
Abu Dhabi. So, for example, where a party sought 
to enforce a DIFC Court judgment against a  
defendant who held assets in Abu Dhabi, would 
the Abu Dhabi local court automatically endorse 
this judicial order? In theory, there was a  
multi-step procedure, as provided for within  
Article 221 of  the UAE’s federal civil code, which 
needed to be followed.
First, the DIFC Court formally had to refer its 
judgment to the local court of  the other Emirate. 
Specifically, this meant that the DIFC judge had 
to file a set of  papers that outlined the case and 
then state the rationale for the decision rendered. 
Once the local court of  the other Emirate received 
the paperwork, it then had the prerogative to 
review the case for procedural defects. (It was not 
supposed to offer an opinion on the substantive 
merits of  the DIFC Courts’ case.) Furthermore,  
a decision by the local court (as it related to 
procedural matters) was subject to that  
jurisdiction’s appellate body.60
DIFC Courts officials and others who wanted to 
expedite execution orders in the other Emirates 
saw this Article 221 practice as time consuming 
and rife with potential delay. There were also  
concerns regarding the unwillingness of  local 
courts in the other Emirates to cede their  
jurisdiction and ability to review, de novo, matters 
E n f o r c e m e n t  O u t s i d e  D u b a i  b u t 
I n s i d e  t h e  U A E 
Chief Justice Michael Hwang SC,  
DIFC Courts, and Chief Justice Sundaresh 
Menon, Supreme Court of Singapore,  
sign a Memorandum of Guidance in 2015.
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from an institution they perceived as an external 
court. Additionally, there was a sense that the local 
courts invoked their procedural powers of  review 
to encroach upon the substantive merits of  cases. 
Finally, given that parties retained the right to 
appeal, there was a belief  that legislative changes 
were needed to Article 221 in order to accelerate 
the execution process.61
The passage of  the 2011 Dubai reform statute 
sought, in part, to remedy these issues. The 
law mandated that a DIFC Courts order ‘shall 
be executed by the competent entity having 
jurisdiction outside [the] DIFC in accordance with 
the procedure and rules adopted by such entities 
in this regard ...’62 In other words, the local courts 
within the other Emirates were obliged to carry 
out DIFC orders. Moreover, DIFC Courts officials 
formally signed memoranda of  understanding with 
their Emirati court counterparts as a means of 
further solidifying the intent of  the legislation.
It would seem that these steps would have quelled 
any concern lawyers had regarding enforcement 
of  a DIFC judgment outside of  Dubai but within 
the UAE. Yet, given the actual rarity of  an Emirati 
court outside of  Dubai being asked to enforce a 
DIFC judgment (at least since the 2011 statute was 
passed), to-date, it has been hard to know for sure. 
What is known is that these lawyers also had  
concerns when it came to enforceability outside of 
the UAE altogether. This point is discussed next.
has a series of  bilateral treaties on judicial  
enforcement, including those with Tunisia,  
India, China and France.68
Several international lawyers stated these agreements 
theoretically should be of  value and serve as 
important instruments that they can employ on 
behalf  of  their clients. Yet the aforementioned 
impasse, of  trying to enforce judgments in other 
Emirates within the UAE, materialises here as 
well. Specifically, each of  the above conventions 
has ‘procedural outs’69 within them that allow 
courts in the non-originating jurisdiction to review 
the case at hand. It is true that these reviewing 
courts are not supposed to perform a substantive 
merits evaluation, but the lawyers who work in this 
area noted that the lines are often blurred between 
what is a procedural and substantive analysis.70 As 
such, judges retain the ability to review matters in 
more than just peripheral ways, especially if  they 
decide to take an aggressive approach to their 
jobs as adjudicators—a troublesome possibility for 
practicing international lawyers.71
Therefore, given these various hurdles that  
international lawyers saw as hindering  
enforcement of  DIFC Court judgments (abroad 
and domestically), during the early years they  
offered a strategic piece of  advice to their clients 
on matters of  commercial dispute resolution:  
use arbitration.
During the initial years, international lawyers 
had a persistent question: Would judgments 
rendered by the DIFC Courts be enforced in 
other countries? Given their global clientele, this 
question was of  utmost importance for the foreign 
bar working within Dubai. Recall, in principle the 
DIFC judiciary was not a foreign entity within 
Dubai, but rather parallel courts integrated within 
the country’s judicial system. That they were 
courts of  the state, therefore, meant that they 
ought to enjoy the benefits from treaties the UAE 
had signed with other countries, as they related  
to the enforcement of  commercially based  
judicial orders.
Regionally, the UAE is a party to the 1983  
Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, 
as well as to the 1995 Gulf  Cooperation Council 
(‘GCC’) Convention.63 The Riyadh Agreement 
has twenty signatories, and of  importance there is 
Article 25(b), which states that ‘each contracting 
party shall recognise the judgments made by the 
courts of  any other contracting party in civil cases 
including ... commercial’64 cases. Moreover, this 
provision deems that, when needed, each of  the 
countries shall ‘implement’65 judicial orders from 
one signatory’s jurisdiction to another’s, and that 
such matters will have ‘the force of  res judicata.’66 
The GCC Convention involves six parties, and  
its pertinent provision provides that they ‘shall 
execute the final judgments issued by the courts  
of  any member state in civil, commercial and  
administrative cases ...’67 In addition, the UAE 
S e e k i n g  E n f o r c e m e n t  b e y o n d  t h e  U A E 
Mark Beer, Registrar General of DIFC Courts, 
welcoming HRH Prince Andrew, Duke of York,  
KG, GCVO, CD, ADC to the DIFC Courts in 2010.
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From the time that they were established, the 
DIFC Courts had a set of  supporters within the 
UAE who challenged the depiction detailed above. 
The first, perhaps most unlikely group, were  
officials working within the local Dubai courts.  
In my multiple trips to the Emirate, I spent time  
at the main courthouse in Dubai and met with 
influential figures there. The complex itself  is a 
marvel of  infrastructural and technological  
innovation. Contrary to the views presented by  
the international lawyers, the courthouse is neither 
chaotic nor haphazardly run. It is true, Arabic is 
the language of  use, but there are also many  
placards with English translations and all of  the 
court staff  with whom I met spoke English as well. 
Upon entering, one sees a main entry foyer with 
administrative desks on both the left and right 
sides. In the middle is an area for people who are 
sitting and waiting their turn before being called 
by a staff  official to proceed to the relevant stall  
to discuss the reason for their presence.
A v e r a g e  W a i t i n g  T i m e  f o r  t h e  
F i r s t  H e a r i n g  i n  t h e  C o m m e r c i a l  C o u r t
T a b l e 1 
TYPE OF CASE AVERAGE
(in number of  days)
Past this main central area, there are courtrooms 
on the same floor and other administrative offices. 
Additional courts are located on higher-level 
floors. Particularly relevant is that since 2008 
there has been a specialised ‘commercial court’ 
tasked with the expeditious handling of  business-
related cases.73 Its jurisdiction covers ‘trade 
issues ... [including] commercial contracts, 
banking, companies, intellectual property, stocks, 
arbitration, bankruptcy, air and maritime  
[matters], and commercial agencies [and]  
attachments cases ...’74 Single judges will hear  
cases in which plaintiffs bring forth claims of  
AED 100,000 (USD 27,000) or less; for claims  
surpassing this amount, a three-judge panel is  
required. Furthermore, this court hears matters 
using the traditional civil-law approach: lawyers 
and parties can appear in person and submit  
required documents upon which the judge and  
an assigned court-expert deliberate. But there  
are also deliberations online, where the court can  
receive documents via its website and provide  
notifications, interim orders, and even final  
judgments electronically.75 
The reason that local court officials value the 
DIFC judiciary is because they perceive it as a 
nice complement to what they are doing. Consider 
Table 1, which draws on information given to me 
during my first trip to Dubai in 2014. It shows 
that for each type of  case that it hears, not one 
category took more than one month before  
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During my most recent research collection,  
Dubai officials provided me with supplemental 
data showing that as of  the end of  2016, the 
average wait time had increased only slightly for 
commercial cases—to 44.3 days. Furthermore, the 
2016 statistics also indicate that 17,639 cases have 
entered the commercial court since its creation, 
but that it takes just a little over three months 
(111.4 days) on average for a judgment to be  
rendered after the first hearing, with 95.2 per  
cent of  cases resolved without being appealed.76
Although they cannot show causality, local court 
officials certainly believe that having another  
forum, such as the DIFC Courts, which hears  
matters like those listed in Table 1 and prides  
itself  on efficient resolution, assists in projecting 
the image that Dubai is a world-class hub for  
commercial activity. An Arab commercial law  
lawyer who works at prestigious regional firm also 
held similar sentiments. This individual conveyed 
how he and his colleagues routinely advise their 
foreign clients to opt in to the DIFC Courts as  
the forum to resolve disputes, whereas with their 
Arab clients they recommend using the Dubai 
commercial court. He added that it is incorrect  
to suggest that the latter only hears petty matters 
and is unsophisticated or unfamiliar with how to 
handle complicated issues. ‘The court can hear 
cases worth many millions of  dollars,’ he stated.77 
Ultimately, local Dubai officials are keenly  
interested in seeing the Emirate’s economy thrive. 
In part, for that to happen, their view is that  
there has to be continued, deep, and sustained 
investment from abroad. Given that the DIFC 
Courts seek to facilitate legal predictability, 
transparency and certainty for overseas investors 
in much of  the same way that the local commercial 
court does for its clientele, the DIFC Courts’ 
presence in Dubai increases the likelihood that 
foreigners will see the UAE as a welcoming place 
to do business.
For businesses and multinational companies,  
the legal professionals on the front lines are  
in-house counsel. These lawyers, however, often 
see a disconnect between their needs and those  
of  the outside law firms they hire for legal  
representation. One main disagreement that  
can occur is on how best to settle disputes. 
According to the in-house counsel interviewed,  
the protracted nature of  the tactics and strategies 
used by law firm lawyers with whom they engage 
is the cause of  much frustration. In particular,  
the insistence by law firm lawyers on employing  
arbitration as the main vehicle for resolving  
disputes was questioned.78 One in-house lawyer 
even went so far as to claim ‘this whole arbitration 
thing is a scam.’79 While other in-house colleagues 
see that view as extreme, for several reasons there 
is a belief  that arbitration is not necessarily the 
only means of  dealing with conflict.
To begin, the possibility (and potential pitfalls) 
of  arbitration arises when a company enters 
into a deal with another party and the contract 
calls for provisions on how best to resolve future 
disputes.80 On basic deals, in-house lawyers will 
routinely handle such negotiations. While they will 
frequently include an arbitration clause within 
the contract, it is also not uncommon for them 
to incorporate a ‘split provision’, with the court 
chosen for litigation to be the DIFC Courts. On 
more complicated transactions, however, in-house 
lawyers will turn to their staple of  law firms for 
consultation, and it is in these situations where 
tensions can emerge.81
Specifically, in-house lawyers stated that they felt 
unsatisfied by the heavy reliance law firm lawyers 
placed on arbitration. ‘What does it even mean 
to prevail in arbitration?’82 asked the legal counsel 
of  a multinational conglomerate. This lawyer 
proceeded to explain that winning an arbitral 
award was only an early first step and did not 
necessitate automatic enforcement of  that award. 
‘We find ourselves having to chase down assets all 
over the place ... and this can take years,’83  
he stated.
Other in-house lawyers supported this point by 
rejecting the argument that arbitrations are speedy 
and efficient. Delays often are present, whether 
they result from the other parties, themselves or 
the arbitrators. One in-house lawyer commented 
that it was not as though when a dispute arises, 
the different parties and arbitrators all peaceably 
go into a room and settle the matter in one sitting. 
Rather, it can take several months just to agree 
on where to meet; and when the arbitration does 
commence the proceedings can be as contentious 
and difficult as any standard litigation matter.84 
For these reasons, in-house lawyers have become 
more sympathetic to privileging the DIFC Courts 
within contracts as the venue for resolving disputes. 
To be sure, arbitration is still used and included in 
agreements, but there is some disillusion with this 
process. By contrast, and based on their own
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experiences, experiences of  others, or upon general 
perceptions they have formed, in-house lawyers 
have a favourable impression of  the DIFC Courts. 
The expediency that the Courts can provide is 
perhaps the most attractive feature. Specifically, 
the DIFC Courts can and do regularly issue 
summary judgment orders. The procedure allows 
cases to be resolved quickly and without the 
laborious, unnecessary hassle (in the eyes of  
in-house lawyers) of  prolonged litigation.85 
In addition, rulings by the DIFC Courts can have 
precedential value for future cases and are thus 
useful for in-house lawyers to consider as they 
make legal decisions on behalf  of  their employers. 
In-house lawyers believe that being able to insert 
the DIFC Courts option as the forum for recourse 
within a contract provides another benefit as well. 
Because parties know that the DIFC Courts place 
a premium on resolving matters expeditiously and 
definitively—and that the loser of  litigation is  
required to pay legal costs for both sides—they 
work hard to avoid being in court. Hence, the  
parties have an incentive to execute the terms of 
the contract, and where they cannot, they tend to 
settle rather than resorting to the DIFC Courts. 
Both the presence and legitimacy of  the DIFC 
Courts, therefore, serve as motivation for the  
parties to adhere to the agreement they signed  
and as a deterrent to parties who are considering 
not fulfilling their contractual obligations.86
There is a corps of  lawyers who work in international 
law firms but who do not hue to the conventional views 
of  dispute settlement. As one of  these respondents 
stated, ‘The majority of  international lawyers are 
sceptical of  anything except for arbitration.’87  
This individual and a minority of  others stated 
that they are sympathetic to the views of  the  
in-house lawyers. Moreover, although these  
international lawyers used arbitration and felt  
that it had important benefits and advantages, 
they also conceded that it can be an expensive 
method of  dispute resolution—especially when 
compared to the DIFC Courts. 
A final reason cited for why these lawyers value 
the DIFC Courts relates to their admiration for 
the sitting judges.88 As discussed in the last chapter, 
the DIFC bench is comprised of  judges from 
different parts of  the world, including Australia, 
Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, and the UAE, and 
they are well-reputed. Their experience is deep, 
and the questions they ask during proceedings 
illustrate they have studied the cases beforehand 
and care about the justice being administered. In 
fact, some lawyers stated that they had actually 
appeared before certain judges in those judges’ 
respective home jurisdictions. ‘In my experience, 
they are every bit as good here as they were there,’89 
one lawyer remarked. Other lawyers echoed this 
sentiment, and as for the Emirati judges on the 
DIFC Courts, lawyers familiar with them also 
commented positively on their legal acumen.90
In the previous chapter, Sir Anthony commented 
on Mark Beer’s role in shaping the DIFC Courts 
into a global institution. Within the DIFC, Beer’s 
staff  respects him greatly and, like him, they too 
are strong champions of  the DIFC Courts. Beer 
and his colleagues are resolute in presenting not 
just a rebuttal but also a powerful, affirmative case 
for why the DIFC Courts are necessary and vital 
to the strength of  Dubai’s growth as an  
international business hub.
First, Beer flatly rejects the point that DIFC 
Courts’ judgments are difficult to enforce in 
Dubai, the greater UAE, or abroad. ‘Suggestions 
that DIFC Courts’ decisions are any harder to 
enforce in the Middle East than other UAE courts’ 
decisions or arbitral awards are simply misguided 
and, sadly, on occasion, intentionally misleading 
so as to steer unsuspecting clients into a more  
expensive, time-consuming and opaque process 
with little chance of  effective enforcement,’ says 
Beer.91 As previously stated, it is a requirement 
that ‘DIFC Courts’ judgments are enforced 
through the Dubai Courts, in accordance with the 
Federal Civil Procedures Law’92 and Dubai Law 
16 of  2011.93 Beer’s office keeps a running tally 
of  how ‘[t]here are a number of  cases where DIFC 
Courts’ orders have been enforced by the Dubai 
Courts ... [even now including] interim orders, 
such as freezing orders (Mareva injunctions),’94 
and arbitration ratification decrees.95 According  
to Beer, the DIFC Courts are integrated within, 
and are part and parcel of, the Dubai and UAE 
judicial system.96
Given this approach, then, the second area of  
concern—relating to whether DIFC judicial  
orders are enforceable in another Emirate, such 
as Abu Dhabi—should be alleviated. (The DIFC 
Courts have also recently signed a MOU with 
the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department regarding 
cooperation and the issue relating to enforcement.)  
A basic element of  the UAE’s judicial system is 
that court orders from one Emirate are respected  
and enforced in another. If  DIFC Courts’ 
judgments are recognised and enforceable by  
(and on par with) the local Dubai court rulings, 
then it only follows that DIFC judicial orders 
should be recognised within the other Emirates 
as well.97 While some international lawyers may 
question this proposition, not all do, and there  
are those who have issued legal opinions or written 
articles affirming this contention.98
Moreover, this type of  excessive worrying about 
enforcement misses a key point discussed earlier 
on the DIFC Courts’ workload. Recall that over 
90 per cent of  all of  the cases that come before 
the DIFC Courts settle before there is a final 
judgment. In fact, ‘[t]he DIFC Courts are set up 
to promote settlement. Settlement not only saves 
parties time and money but it allows them to work 
together in the future and to continue doing  
business.’99 The notion that there is somehow 
a flood of  judgments emerging from the DIFC 
Courts that are in need of  enforcement in other 
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Emirates is not the reality. That it has not been 
common for a DIFC judgment’s enforceability to 
be routinely tested in a place like Abu Dhabi is not 
indicative of  a fear of  using the DIFC Courts, but 
rather, and less dramatically, merely symptomatic 
of  the absence of  a situation in which this issue 
has arisen. This is because, as Beer reiterated, 
parties typically settle—a key for why they deeply 
value the process.100 
This rebuttal by Beer also relates to another issue 
that he believes is an improper metric by which  
to evaluate the DIFC Courts. Some observers  
discussed above wondered how busy the Courts 
really are, and whether, given how few cases go 
to trial, the DIFC judiciary makes a substantive 
difference in the lives of  businesspeople working 
in the region. For Beer, this is a spurious point, 
because as he remarked, judging a court by how 
many cases are on a docket is similar to evaluating a 
hospital based on the number of  patients that are 
in sickbeds or are dying.101 If  a court is doing its 
job, and its judgments are perceived as legitimate, 
efficient, final, and enforceable, then rational  
parties (many of  whom will have contracted for 
the DIFC Courts as the forum to settle disputes) 
will not need the Court to tell them the outcome, 
or that the outcome will be effectively enforced. 
Put another way, the greater the certainty and 
trust that the DIFC Courts will deliver justice  
consistently and in accordance with the law, the 
more able a law firm is to advise its client on the 
probable outcome of  any claim—and so the  
greater the likelihood of  a pre-filing settlement.  
If, however, a party opts for going to trial, the 
DIFC Courts are there to serve them; the process 
will most likely be cheaper and quicker than  
arbitration (albeit less private and without the 
ability to select the judge);102 and given that the 
judgments are issued with the Dubai Ruler’s  
imprimatur, they will be enforced throughout  
the country.
Regarding enforcement beyond the country’s  
borders, since the DIFC Courts are on equal  
footing with the Dubai local courts, there is no 
issue with enforcing DIFC judgments in countries 
that are parties to the GCC Protocol or the  
Riyadh Convention, or within states with which 
the UAE has a bilateral treaty. For other countries, 
the memoranda that Beer has facilitated between 
the DIFC judiciary and the courts in Britain, the 
US, Singapore and Australia, for example, do 
matter and clearly signal these judges’ respect for 
DIFC Court judgments and vice versa. Beer, of 
course, knows that these memoranda are not  
binding treaties. But judges, judicial organisations 
and even bar associations from different geographic 
locations regularly enter into cooperative arrangements 
and memorialise them by signing MOUs. Moreover 
it is not so remarkable that judges from different 
jurisdictions: a) see the positive work from the 
DIFC Courts; b) recognise that the Courts have 
the endorsement of  the UAE government; and 
c) are willing to respect and enforce judgments 
that emerge from the DIFC judiciary. If  the 
Courts were not held in such high regard, and if 
enforcement was going to be a problem, then why 
would eminent jurists from different jurisdictions 
even meet, let alone sign cooperative agreements 
that impact their own reputations?103 
In sum, Beer’s charge is to do what is best and just 
for parties engaging in commercial transactions. 
This attitude also explains his decision to meet 
with members of  the Dubai legal community, 
including arbitration lawyers, to discuss ways  
of  ‘convert[ing] a DIFC Courts judgment into  
an arbitral award [and] providing greater 
enforcement internationally under the provisions 
of  the New York Convention of  1958,’104 an 
idea originally proposed by Tim Taylor, QC 
but then subsequently developed by Chief  Justice 
Hwang.105 The choice between opting for the 
DIFC judicial process or arbitration is not a zero-
sum game. As Chapter One discussed, the DIFC 
Courts regularly work with arbitration lawyers 
(particularly those using DIFC-LCIA arbitration), 
namely when arbitral awards need to be ratified. 
Therefore, Beer welcomes opportunities to work 
with the arbitration bar—especially since his 
ultimate objective remains providing the business 
community with the comfort of  knowing that the 
DIFC Courts operate in a collaborative, efficient, 
and commercially friendly manner.106
***
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As we have seen, initially the Courts started with 
an approach that might be deemed as conservative 
and strictly interpretive in matters involving  
statutory construction—even where they  
acknowledged that the outcome might be unfair  
or wrong. As the years went on, however, the 
Courts then became bolder, leading to decisions 
such as Corinth and the series of  judgments that 
followed. Yet, as the discussion of  the 2017 cases 
illustrate, particularly at the Court of  Appeal 
level, there has recently been a slight twist to this 
narrative. The Court of  Appeal’s decisions in two 
key employment cases involving Asif  Hakim Adil 
and Peter Gray, respectively, showed a judiciary 
returning to more of  its pre-Corinth tendencies. At 
the same time, however, the decision in the  
David Haigh case, where Haigh was allowed to 
move ahead with his defences in spite of  his  
criticisms towards the process, showed a Court 
that was tolerant and willing to permit a case  
to proceed in order to ensure the protection of 
a defendant’s rights. 
What might have prompted the Court of  Appeal 
to decide these employment matters in these  
particular ways? One theory is that during 2016 
and 2017 the climate surrounding—and domestic  
attitudes toward—the DIFC Courts became 
increasingly more circumspect. (Chapter Three 
delves further into this issue.) Perhaps then the 
Courts wanted to carefully position themselves  
in a fashion so that there could be no question  
that they were, first and foremost, a neutral  
decision-making institution that had to faithfully 
follow the law, even if  that meant ceding jurisdiction 
in a Peter Gray-type case on the one hand, while 
allowing a litigant who had castigated them the 




The second objective of  this chapter has been 
to discuss whether these Court-rulings are being 
translated from judgments on paper into tangible  
relief  for the winning side. This issue, during the 
early years, was of  major concern to different 
stakeholders who expressed scepticism that such  
judgments meant anything substantive outside of 
the DIFC’s boundaries. But as the rebuttals to this 
perspective demonstrate, various Court judgments 
have been recognised and enforced in different 
jurisdictions—onshore in Dubai, within the UAE, 
around the region, and in different parts of  the 
world. Given these developments, supporters have 
good reason to feel positive about all that the 
DIFC Courts have accomplished in such a  
short period of  time.
However, as Chapter Three will next detail, these 
sentiments have had to be placed in check due to a 
significant development that has recently occurred 
and has remained unresolved as of  this writing. 
As several of  the judges have remarked, the DIFC 
Courts’ experiment could be seriously tested  
because of  tensions that have emerged with the 
local Dubai judiciary. We turn to this issue now.
This chapter has sought to accomplish two goals. 
First, there has been a discussion of  the how the 
DIFC Courts’ jurisprudence has evolved over crucial 
moments since their founding. As this story reveals, 
the Courts have had to find their own institutional  
position within a context inherently foreign to 
them—trying to integrate and work on par with the 
local judiciary on the one hand, while at the same 
time actively presenting a global, international  
disposition to lawyers, investors and judicial  
colleagues around the world. 
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LLP
Conyers Dill & Pearman*
Cotty Vivant Marchisio & 
Lauzeral*
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt 
& Mosle LLP*
Davidson & Co4  
Dechert LLP* 
Dentons
DLA Piper LLP 
Dumon & Partners5 
A P P E N D I X  A  
( *  = F i r m s  R e g i s t e r e d  A t  T h e  D I F C ) 1
1	 This	is	an	updated	version	from	what	the	pilot	study	in	2014	compiled.	The	list	of 	firms	









the	firms	within	this	table.	(Diana	Hamade, Lack of  Regulation Leads to a Free-for-All in Legal Practices,  







The	Government	of 	Dubai	Legal	Affairs	Department	was	emailed,	but	a	confirmation	of 	the	number	 
of 	international	firms	currently	practicing	in	its	Emirate	was	not	received.
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King & Wood Mallesons  
SJ Berwin7
K&L Gates LLP*
Latham & Watkins LLP*















10 In their Dubai practice, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius operates in association with Mohammed 
Buhashem Advocates & Legal Consultants.
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the	firm	as	Patton	Boggs,	but that is likely because it has not been updated.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
This year, 2018, marks a momentous year in the 
history of  the DIFC Courts. Namely, it serves 
as the ten-year anniversary of  Sir Anthony’s 
commemorative 2008 speech as well as Dr Michael 
Hwang’s tenure as Chief  Justice. Chapter One has 
already provided a brief  biography of  Chief  Justice 
Hwang. In an effort to examine what a decade 
as Chief  Justice has meant to him, I had the 
opportunity to spend four days with Dr Hwang, 
interviewing him extensively for two of  the days as 
well as accompanying him to events, meetings, and 
dinners on the others. Beyond his elite credentials 
and impressive professional experiences, the 
Chief  Justice, personally, is a warm, engaging, 
curious, and deeply contemplative person. He 
is soft-spoken and humble, yet he is clearly a 
strong-minded and strong-willed individual who 
commands respect from his peers and the lawyers 
and parties who appear in front of  him.1
Chief  Justice Hwang explained to me the recent 
developments that have occurred regarding  
the DIFC Courts and the local Dubai judiciary. 
Specifically, on 9 June 2016, HH the Ruler  
of  Dubai signed ‘Decree 19’, which set forth  
‘the establishment of  a Judicial Tribunal for the 
Dubai Courts and DIFC Courts’.2 Michael Black, 
QC and Tom Montagu-Smith, QC, the drafters  
of  the rules for the DIFC Courts, have written  
a thoughtful analysis on the implications of  
this decree.3 As their paper indicates, Decree 19 
was passed in the context of  a DIFC judiciary 
that had not shied away from exercising its 
jurisdictional authority, along the lines of  what 
was discussed in Chapter Two. Citing the powers 
granted under Article 7 of  the Judicial Authority 
Law (JAL) and several of  the cases discussed 
earlier (e.g., Corinth, National Bonds, and Standard 
Chartered)—where the Courts affirmatively 
exhibited their reach—Black and Montagu-Smith 
argue that it was inevitable that tensions between 
the DIFC Courts and the local Dubai judiciary 
would emerge.4
Yet, the conflict was accentuated even more when 
it came to ‘the enforcement of  arbitration awards 
...’5 Recall from Chapter Two that the DIFC 
Courts had established that they could serve as 
a conduit, in order to allow a party to enforce 
a foreign judgment onshore—or outside the 
parameters of  the DIFC’s borders. As Black and 
Montagu-Smith point out, the JAL also mandates 
that the local Dubai courts and the DIFC Courts 
act reciprocally towards one another when it 
comes to recognising and executing arbitration 
awards, including those that are foreign-based. 
Otherwise put, ‘the JAL permits a party to enforce 
a foreign arbitration award in the DIFC Courts 
and then seek execution in the Dubai Courts.’6 
Moreover, Articles 42-44 of  the DIFC Arbitration 
Law (2008, amended in 2013) were intentionally 
written to empower the DIFC Courts in arbitral 
award cases and to be read together with the JAL.7
S O M E  B A C K G RO U N D
Decree 19 and the Introduction  
of  the Judicial Tribunal
85
Given the explicit language of  these statutes,  
it should not be surprising that the DIFC Courts 
would seek to apply them to the cases that 
emerged. For example, in two key decisions the 
Courts held that they could enforce a foreign 
award irrespective of  whether there was a nexus to 
the DIFC itself. In Egan v Eava, the Court of  First 
Instance dealt with a case involving claimants who 
looked to have a foreign arbitration award enforced 
against a company that was headquartered 
onshore in Dubai but that had no connection to 
the DIFC. In denying the defendant’s contention 
that the DIFC Courts had no jurisdiction to hear 
this matter, Sir John Chadwick stated that the 
reading of  the DIFC Arbitration Law, together 
with the JAL, precisely gave the Courts the power 
to adjudicate.8 Building upon this decision, the 
Court of  Appeal in Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd 
v Meydan Group LLC held that it could enforce a 
foreign arbitration award even where neither party 
was based in the DIFC and where the arbitral seat 
was onshore, or, in other words, outside of  the 
DIFC but still in Dubai.9
The DIFC Courts have also not been willing to 
concede that there are constitutional or public 
policy problems when interpreting the JAL and the 
Arbitration Law together. Such an argument was 
indeed made by the defendants in Fiske and Firmin 
v Firuzeh. For the Court of  First Instance, which 
heard this case, the intentions of  the drafters 
of  both laws were clear, and as such it held that 
any claims that recognition and enforcement by 
the DIFC Courts ‘would be against UAE public 
policy ... [or against] the DIFC Arbitration Law 
must fail.’10 In addition, the Courts have taken 
other steps to enhance their power in arbitration 
matters. First, they have stated that they have the 
right to interpret contracts that reference local 
Dubai Courts or onshore Dubai law for arbitration 
purposes to necessarily include the DIFC Courts 
and DIFC laws. Second, the DIFC Courts also 
see themselves as being able to issue ‘an order 
enforcing interim measures granted by the arbitral 
tribunal ... [upon request] (from the tribunal).’11 
This power is critical because a losing party 
during an arbitration may seek to hide reachable 
assets before an award is provided; thus such an 
order by the DIFC Courts can block this effort.12
And third, the DIFC Courts have decided to ‘stay’ 
a DIFC judicial matter while a foreign arbitration 
is pending—thereby illustrating their respect for 
the proceeding taking place abroad, as well as the 
belief  that the foreign outcome can subsequently 
be brought to the DIFC for recognition and 
enforcement. Recall that in Chapter Two, the 
DWS case was discussed, where the Court of  First 
Instance allowed a case to continue in the DIFC 
despite a foreign arbitration that was occurring 
in London at the LCIA. However, as later cases 
show, DWS was an anomaly. This precedent has 
not been followed, including in the important case 
of  International Electromechanical Services Co. LLC v (1) 
Al Fattan Engineering LLC and (2) Al Fattan Properties 
LLC, which held that a DIFC-case should indeed be 
stayed where an arbitration outside of  the DIFC  
was ongoing. The reason is because of  ‘the 
risk that an ongoing foreign arbitration would 
create conflicting decisions and duplicative costs 
unnecessary to the resolution of  the case.’13
These decisions on arbitration matters and 
foreign judgments illustrate that the DIFC Courts 
are a global, international institution, which 
understands, respects and enforces commercial  
law outcomes that occur outside of  Dubai, within 
Dubai. And for a moment, the local Dubai courts 
were on board as well. Consider the case of  Oger 
Dubai LLC v Daman Real Estate Capital Partners Ltd. 
Here, an arbitration award went against Daman, 
and Oger wanted to enforce the decision in the 
DIFC, because of  where Daman’s assets were 
located. Because the seat of  the arbitration was 
onshore at the Dubai International Arbitration 
Centre, Daman asked the local Dubai Court,  
and then subsequently the Dubai Court of  Appeal, 
to nullify the arbitral judgment. Subsequently, 
Daman also asked the DIFC Courts to suspend  
or adjourn its decision on enforcement until the 
local Dubai courts had completed their review. 
The DIFC Courts agreed to do so temporarily so 
long as Daman ‘post[ed] security in the amount 
of  the award and the costs.’14 The local Dubai 
judiciary ultimately refused to intervene, stating 
that they had no jurisdiction and holding that this 
matter needed to be settled by the DIFC Courts.15
It would seem as though this case would thus  
be resolved. But with the introduction of  Decree 
19 in 2016, the story had only just begun. The 
Judicial Tribunal (JT), which was established by 
Decree 19 became an important institution in this 
case. The JT was comprised of  seven members—
three from the DIFC (Chief  Justice Hwang, 
Deputy Chief  Justice Sir David Steel, and Justice 
Omar Al Muhairi), three from the Dubai Courts 
(Chief  Justice of  the Dubai Court of  Cassation, 
Dr Ali Ibrahim Al Iman, Justice Essa Mohammed 
Sharif, and Chief  Justice of  the Dubai Court 
of  First Instance, Justice Jassim Baqer), and the 
Secretary General of  the Dubai Judicial Council 
(Chancellor Khalifa Rashid bin Demas). Chief 
Justice Al Iman served also as the President of  the 
JT, thus giving him effectively two votes in the 
event of  a deadlock. (Note: The Decree did not 
mandate that all members sit together at one time 
in order to hear a case. Instead, it stated that  
‘[d]ecisions of  the Judicial Tribunal will be carried 
[out] by a majority of  the voting members  
in attendance’).16
Returning to the case, Daman decided to appeal 
to the Dubai Court of  Cassation. At the same 
time, Daman also filed a motion in the JT, asking 
it ‘to decide which of  the two courts [the DIFC 
Courts or the local Dubai Courts] is competent 
to determine this case’17 in full. In its first official 
ruling, the JT issued a split judgment, with the 
President casting the deciding vote and the DIFC 
Courts’ justices comprising the dissent. For the
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majority, the case was clear: that both sets of  courts 
were capable of  rendering a valid lawful judgment. 
The	case	on	nullifying	the	award	was	first	brought	
to the local Dubai Courts, and consequently it could 
remain within this track. Moreover, given that the 
Dubai Court of  Cassation still had not reached a 
decision, the JT held that it would be unwise to 
allow the DIFC Courts to continue proceeding  
with enforcement orders, especially if  the Cassation 
Court came back with a judgment saying that the 
entire matter should stay within the local Dubai 
judiciary. As such, the majority ruled that the 
‘DIFC [C]ourts should cease from entertaining  
the case.’18
In a short dissent led by Chief  Justice Hwang, the 
three DIFC Courts’ members disagreed. According 
to the dissent, the JT went beyond its mandate.  
As the opinion stated:
‘1. At all stages it has been accepted by the DIFC  
Courts (“DIFCC”) that the courts of  the arbitral 
seat are the Dubai Courts and that only Dubai 
Courts have jurisdiction to annul the award.
2. The DIFCC has compulsory and exclusive 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for 
recognition and enforcement within the DIFC.
3. There are therefore two competent courts to 
decide this case, each court deciding the matters  
concerning this case within its jurisdiction according 
to the relevant governing its jurisdiction.’19
What was the effect of  this decision by the JT 
insofar as the jurisdictional relationship between 
the DIFC Courts and the local Dubai judiciary 
was concerned? Gordon Blanke, an arbitration 
expert based in Dubai, has argued that the 
judgment ‘may not have [had] as far-reaching 
implications as may appear at first sight.’20 For 
one thing, he notes, the case started in the local 
Dubai Courts and thus there is a logical argument 
for why it should have remained there. (He does 
offer counter-arguments to this point, though.) 
But perhaps more importantly, Blanke points out 
that the language of  the majority opinion gives 
room for a distinction between one court dealing 
with nullification or ‘annulment’21 and another 
addressing the enforcement issue.22
Still, even with this nuanced perspective, the 
overall effect of  Decree 19, the creation of  the 
JT and the Oger decision left many who had been 
working-in or supportive of  the DIFC Courts to 
wonder. Add to this that in December 2017, the 
local Dubai Courts ultimately dismissed all claims 
against Daman and ‘declared null and void a 
Dh965 million arbitral award obtained by Oger.’23 
Indeed in the years that followed, a series of 
decisions emerged from the JT, as well as one  
from the local Dubai judiciary, that provided  
even more layers to these developments.  
We turn to these cases next.
P O S T - O G E R
T H E  D U B A I  W A T E R F RO N T  C A S E  
A N D  R E C O N S I D E R I N G  
T H E  B A N YA N  T R E E  J U D G M E N T
In December 2016, the JT heard its second high 
profile case—Dubai Waterfront LLC v Chenshan Liu.24 
The facts of  this case mirrored Oger, in that an 
onshore arbitral award was issued by the Dubai 
International Arbitration Centre that went against 
Dubai Waterfront, which was a Dubai-based 
company. Dubai Waterfront moved to annul the 
award in the Dubai Courts, while the respondent, 
Chenshan Liu, petitioned the DIFC Courts to 
recognise and enforce the award, which occurred. 
Subsequently, Dubai Waterfront asked the JT 
to declare that the Dubai Courts—and not the 
DIFC Courts—were the proper venue to decide 
on ratifying or annulling the arbitral award. In 
contrast, Liu answered by contending that only  
the DIFC Courts had jurisdiction on these issues.25
In another split decision from the JT (again with 
the President casting the deciding vote), the judges 
from the Dubai Courts again found ‘that both 
courts had concurrent jurisdiction to entertain this 
case,’ [stating]: ‘The DIFC and all its institutions 
were not adversary parties in this dispute. The 
arbitration did not concern a transaction or a 
contract of  sale concluded or to be performed 
within the boundaries of  the DIFC. Also there  
was no agreement between the parties on 
jurisdiction to the DIFC Courts to decide  
this case.’26 
As such, the JT ordered a stoppage to all 
proceedings within the DIFC and ruled in favour  
of  Dubai Waterfront.
 
The dissent, citing the first three points from  
Oger into its opinion, expressed its disagreement.  
Chief  Justice Hwang then added an important line 
by stating that ‘[e]ach Court is ... free to deal with 
the pending applications before it in accordance 
with the laws applicable to such applications.’27 
Given its specific facts, Dubai Waterfront presented 
the JT ‘with a true conduit jurisdiction case’,28 
whereby there was an opportunity to defer to the 
line of  precedent from the DIFC Courts. Yet,  
the majority’s ruling did not take this approach. 
(Note: As of  this writing, the Dubai Court of 
Cassation has recently ruled in favour of  Liu and 
sent the case to the DIFC Courts for a rehearing.  
That decision, to be made by Sir David Steel,  
is currently pending.)29
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This trend of  narrowing the DIFC Courts’ 
purview continued beyond the JT with what 
prominent English QC Rupert Reed referred  
to as a ‘shock decision of  the Dubai Courts’30 
shortly there after. On 15 February 2017, the 
Dubai Court of  First Instance ruled that the  
key, above-mentioned Banyan Tree decision by  
the DIFC’s Court of  Appeal had been wrongly 
decided.31 In fact, the Dubai Court took aim  
at three separate aspects of  Banyan Tree, voiding 
each of  them.32 Reed, together with co-author 
Amr Abdelhadi, dissected the Arabic-written 
opinion of  the Dubai Court and summarised  
the judgment in the following manner:
A). The domestic courts should be considered the 
‘default’33 venue for cases of  concurrent jurisdiction.
B). The DIFC Courts should retain jurisdiction 
over matters within the DIFC or where parties 
‘opt in’, but for all other cases outside of  it, they 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain hearings or to  
offer opinions; and
C). Whenever a holding by a court ‘lacks the 
fundamental qualities of  a valid judgment, ...  
it shall be considered a nullity.’34
As Reed and Abdelhadi explain, the implication 
was that:
(i) ‘there is no need for ... [a DIFC] judgment  
to be challenged by way of  appeal; [because]
(ii) it has no binding force [but nevertheless]
(iii) it does not prevent any party from referring 
the matter to the [domestic] courts of
ordinary jurisdiction.’35
Otherwise put, the Dubai Court’s ruling had 
two consequences. First, it placed into question 
judgments that had been, or were going to be, 
issued by the DIFC Courts. Second, it allowed for 
parties to challenge an outcome from the DIFC 
Courts in a local Dubai Court, thus vitiating 
the long-held understanding that the two sets of 
courts existed as parallel institutional partners.
Reed and Abdelhadi argue that not only did this 
rationale allow the Dubai Court to strike down 
the pivotal DIFC Banyan Tree case, but that it also 
did more. Namely, it enabled the Dubai Court 
affirmatively to reference and interpret the 2009 
Protocol of  Enforcement (which set forth a mutual 
understanding of  reciprocity between the two 
judiciaries) in a new way: to permit the Dubai 
Court ‘to determine whether a judgment presented 
to it for enforcement was within the jurisdiction 
of  the DIFC Courts.’36 According to Reed and 
Abdelhadi, such an interpretation was contrary to 
the intent of  the JAL (Article 5A(1)(e)), which gave 
the DIFC Courts sole control to decide whether 
they could hear a matter under either Article 24 
of  the DIFC Court Law or Article 42 of  the DIFC 
Arbitration Law.37 As of  this writing, it is unclear 
if  or when this unprecedented decision will be 
considered by the Dubai Court of  Appeal.38
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T H E  2 0 1 7  T E R M
In the first case of  2017, the Gulf  Navigation 
party appeared against Jinhai Heavy Industry 
Company.39 And once again, the case involved 
the enforcement of  a foreign arbitral award, 
issued originally by the London International 
Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA), which 
found in favour of  Jinhai Heavy in the amount of 
USD 14.55 million. (The LMAA held that Gulf 
Navigation had breached a shipbuilding contract 
by failing to make good on a second instalment-
payment of  a vessel that Jinhai Heavy had built.40) 
Gulf  Navigation moved to vacate the award in the 
London Commercial Court, which rejected this 
motion, and then subsequently, Jinhai Heavy sought 
to enforce it in the DIFC Courts in November 2015. 
Less than a month later the DIFC Courts issued a 
judgment recognising and enforcing this award, 
which Gulf  Navigation never challenged—even 
though it had a right to do so. In January 2016, 
Gulf  Navigation sought a postponement of  the 
arbitral enforcement, arguing that before this 
order had been issued, it had asked an onshore 
Dubai Courts body—the Amicable Settlement of 
Disputes Centre (ASDC)—to rehear the case.41
The question for the JT was whether Gulf 
Navigation could proceed with its claim in the 
ASDC. In an extraordinary opinion, the majority, 
led by the set of  judges from the Dubai Courts, 
said yes. Ruling that the ASDC ‘had been 
established by the [Dubai] Law No. 16/2009 ... 
[which] provides that this Center is attached to 
the [Dubai] courts ... [and that any] settlement 
rendered by the Center is to be confirmed by the 
[Dubai Courts] judge,’ the majority concluded 
that ‘the Center is an integral part of  the Dubai 
Courts’.42 The JT then proceeded to hold that the 
DIFC Courts could no longer be involved with 
this case, justifying its decision by saying that it 
wanted to promote harmony and avoid potential 
contradictory opinions coming out of  two different 
judiciaries.43 In fact, it concluded that ‘[a]ccording 
to the general principles of  laws embodied in the 
procedure laws[,] and since [the] Dubai Courts 
have the general jurisdiction, they are the competent 
courts to entertain this case.’44
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The DIFC-bloc issued a dissent. To begin, it noted 
that not once had Gulf  Navigation objected to the 
jurisdiction of  the LMAA while that arbitration 
was ongoing. After the English Commercial 
Court refused to set aside the award, protocol 
dictated that all signatories to the 1958 New York 
Convention (which includes the UAE) recognise 
and enforce it. In fact, it is important to reproduce 
portions of  the dissent that systematically rebut 
what it believed were the majority’s ‘incorrect 
statement of  international law’.45 To begin, the 
dissent noted that ‘part of  Dubai law ... provided 
for in Article II(3) of  the New York Convention 
(“NYC”) which has been acceded to by the UAE,’46 
holds that where ‘parties agree to refer a dispute 
to arbitration, especially international arbitration, 
then the Courts (and anybody attached to a court) 
will not exercise jurisdiction over that dispute but 
will leave it to the chosen arbitration body to 
resolve that dispute.’47
In addition, the dissent argued that under:
‘Article (5)(A)(1) of  Dubai Law No. (12) of  2004  
(as amended by Law No. (16 of  2011) (“the 
Judicial Authority Law”)[,] it is clearly stated 
that, where [the] DIFCC has jurisdiction, it is 
“exclusive jurisdiction ... Article (5)A1(e) of  the 
same law [also] provides that “[a]ny claim or 
action over which the Courts have jurisdiction in 
accordance with DIFC laws and DIFC Regulations” 
is a matter coming within exclusive jurisdiction of 
the DIFCC. ... [And that] Article 42(1) of  DIFC 
Arbitration Law 2008 is a law that comes within 
Article (5)A(e) and therefore [the] DIFCC has 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear this case.’48
The dissent then went on to say that Article 42 
also gives the DIFC Courts the power to enforce 
awards. And it finally concluded by citing Article 
8(2)(7) of  Dubai Law No. 9 of  2004 (as amended 
by Law No. 7 of  2011), as well as Article 4 
of  Decree 19 of  2016, to state it ‘respectfully 
disagree[d] with’ the majority’s rationale.49
For the dissent, in sum, the majority’s ruling 
left great unpredictability for future parties. 
Recall, the application by Gulf  Navigation to 
have this case be heard by the ASDC came after 
proceedings to recognise and enforce the award 
in the DIFC Courts had commenced, which 
should have quashed any subsequent hearing in 
any other court within the Emirate. Moreover, 
Gulf  Navigation had never raised a jurisdictional 
objection to the DIFC Courts until the matter 
came before the JT. Instead, when it originally 
approached the DIFC Courts it had asked for 
a stay, which the dissent observed showed Gulf 
Navigation ‘expressly recognizing that [the] 
DIFCC did have jurisdiction to hear the case,  
and was asking the DIFCC to exercise its 
jurisdiction in [its] favour ...’50
In fact, the dissent replicated these points in a 
second case during the 2017 term where the 
respondent, Sweet Homes Real Estate LLC, had 
won an onshore arbitration award in the Dubai 
International Arbitration Centre, against a one 
Ramadan Mishmish.51 Mishmish applied to the 
Dubai Courts to set aside the award; thereafter, 
Sweet Homes moved to have the award recognised 
and enforced in the DIFC Courts, which was 
eventually issued. Mishmish then filed a motion 
in the Union Supreme Court, which ruled that 
the JT was best able to determine the jurisdiction 
of  this matter. The JT held that the local Dubai 
Courts were the proper venue for all of  the 
reasons stated in its Gulf  Navigation decision. And 
similar to before, the dissent reiterated its position 
that Dubai’s own law and the DIFC Arbitration 
Law mandated that it could recognise and enforce 
this DIAC award.52
And in Endofa DMCC v D’Amico Shipping Italy, the 
majority votes from the JT held that an English 
commercial court judgment could not be enforced 
by the DIFC Courts. The respondent had sued 
and won a judgment in London against the 
appellant for the latter’s failure to pay for the 
shipping of  crude oil it had transported from 
Ghana to Germany. The appellant argued that 
there had been delays in the delivery that negated 
its obligation to pay, and in the alternative that 
even if  a judgment had been rendered in England, 
the DIFC Courts did not have jurisdiction over it 
because it was an onshore Dubai company that did 
‘not have any connection with the DIFC ... [and] 
neither assets ... nor any business connection with 
the DIFC.’53
The majority was persuaded by the appellant’s 
argument and thereafter prohibited the DIFC 
Courts from continuing with any further 
proceedings on the matter. It then held that where 
a case is present in both sets of  courts, it does not 
matter when either was filed, so long as the JT had 
not yet delivered a judgment. Otherwise put, after 
Endofa it would appear that a party could use the 
onshore courts at any time (prior to a JT verdict) 
as a means of  halting what otherwise would be a 
legitimate procedure in the DIFC Courts. As the 
dissent stated, such behaviour by a party would be 
an ‘abuse of  process.’54
At the same time, it is important to note that the 
remainder of  the cases from the 2017 term were 
all unanimous. In Emirates Trading Agency LLC v 
Bocimar International N.V., the JT unanimously 
dismissed the appellant’s challenge to a DIFC 
recognition and enforcement judgment of  a 
London Commercial Court ruling.55 This was 
a relatively easy case. There was no competing 
case in the local Dubai Courts and the appellant 
had ‘waived ... objection’56 to the DIFC Courts 
to hear the matter originally. Note, the Endofa 
dissent entered into this decision in terms of  the 
Emirates Trading appellant’s motion that the DIFC 
Courts were unconstitutional. However, the JT 
rejected this plea outright—and drew directly 
upon additional language of  the previous dissent 
led by Chief  Justice Hwang.57 As the Tribunal in 
Emirates Trading stated, only the Federal Supreme 
Court could adjudicate on this question, and it 
was improper and ‘groundless’58 for the appellant 
to expect anything otherwise. 
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Indeed, the final three cases of  the 2017 term 
continued this trend of  unanimity, leading some 
to speculate recently that the ‘[p]endulum [has] 
swung back in favour of  the DIFC Courts ... ’59 In 
Assas Investments Limited v Fius Capital Limited, the JT 
unanimously upheld the enforcement of  a DIFC-
LCIA arbitration award by the DIFC Courts.60 
Even though the respondent was concurrently 
pursuing a claim against the appellant in the local 
Dubai Courts, the JT unanimously found no 
conflict or problem of  jurisdictional confusion. 
The reason was because each of  the ‘parallel 
execution proceedings’61 involved the respondent 
seeking to reach separate assets of  the appellant—
one set located within the DIFC and the other 
located onshore.62
In the final case of  2017, a Cayman Island 
company, VIH, contracted with Assas OPCO 
Limited to manage a hotel that the latter owned.66 
Assas cancelled the agreement with VIH after 
accusing it of  hiring employees without correct 
documentation and not having a valid license 
to operate in Dubai.67 Thereafter, VIH sought a 
stay within the DIFC Courts, while Assas went 
to the local Dubai Courts to invalidate the entire 
agreement. The DIFC Courts granted the stay 
while an arbitration (which was provided for in 
the original agreement) was to commence in order 
to resolve the dispute. Assas argued that strictly 
based on past case law the JT ought to send the 
matter to the local Dubai Courts as the venue 
of  ordinary jurisdiction. Instead, a unanimous 
Tribunal held that even though both sets of  courts 
had pending cases before them, because neither 
had issued a substantive ruling, there was no need 
to disrupt the interim measure that had been 
issued by the DIFC Courts.68 As the panel held, 
‘at this stage, there is no conflict of  jurisdiction 
between the two courts ... [and as such the 
Tribunal] should not intervene.’69
***
The Tribunal then heard a follow-up to its 2016 
case involving IGP and Standard Chartered.63 
Recall that in 2016 the JT sided with the 
respondent in allowing the DIFC Courts to 
continue to proceed with the case it was hearing 
because of  the appellant’s earlier acknowledgment 
that the matter was in the proper venue. In this 
2017 case, IGP wanted to make counterclaims in 
the DIFC Courts, which the Courts were willing 
to allow so long as IGP ‘abandon[ed] its petition 
before the Union Supreme Court [that the DIFC 
was the improper venue] and that ... [it] settle[d] 
the costs ordered in the ... [earlier] proceedings.’64 
IGP refused and brought this second case to the 
JT asking it to nullify these pre-conditions. The 
Tribunal adamantly refused to do so, citing the 
independence of  both the DIFC Courts and 
the local Dubai Courts to administer their own 
procedural affairs.65
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To review, we have seen that 2016 was a pivotal 
year for the DIFC Courts. Decree 19 was 
passed and the JT came into existence, which 
thereafter issued split-judgments in Oger and 
Dubai World. However, the JT followed up these 
cases, per endnote 38 above, with unanimous 
decisions in Marine Logistics Solutions LLC, Gulf 
Navigation Holding and Investment Group Private LTC. 
Subsequently, the JT then split again on three 
early cases of  2017, but the last four cases that  
it heard during this term all resulted in  
unanimous judgments.
For some observers, the split opinions in 2016 and 
2017 may raise two related questions. First, did 
the JT seek to curtail the DIFC Courts’ authority 
in the areas of  recognising and enforcing foreign 
judgments and foreign arbitral awards? Otherwise 
put, as the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction has expanded 
over the years, might the local judiciary (and 
thereby the judges from the local Dubai Courts 
sitting on the JT) have felt as though there had 
been unnecessary encroachment on certain matters 
that the latter thought should be left to it?
Although it may be attractive to answer these 
questions in the affirmative, upon reflection a 
more measured analysis is needed. Consider that  
a good number of  the JT’s cases—particularly 
those at the end of  its 2017 term—were 
unanimously decided. While it may be tempting 
to accentuate the differences between the JT’s 
justices from the local Dubai Courts and those 
from the DIFC, in reality overall there was mutual 
agreement among the members of  the Tribunal 
in the majority of  the matters that were heard. 
Particularly in these latter unanimously held 
cases, there was consensus among the JT justices 
as to the DIFC Courts’ jurisdictional, recognition 
and enforcement powers—as well as to its 
constitutionality.70
Still, it is important to ask, especially as we enter 
the tenth year of  Chief  Justice Hwang’s tenure, 
what the developments of  Decree 19 and the JT 
mean for the DIFC Courts. As this book goes to 
print, the DIFC Court of  First Instance, in the 
spring of  2018, issued a ruling that Gordon Blanke 
has described as providing ‘encouraging sobriety 
and ... breath[ing] life back into the DIFC Courts’ 
status as a conduit jurisdiction.’71 But overall, in 
the years ahead, what will the Courts look like 
and will they continue to be able to thrive? Are 
reforms to Decree 19 on the horizon, and if  so, 
when, and what might these amendments be? The 
concluding chapter of  this study will attempt to 
address these queries. It then will set forth what the 
broader lessons of  this experiment have been for 
Dubai as well as for other jurisdictions that are 
contemplating establishing similar types of  courts of 
their own, or are already in the process of  doing so.
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C O N C L U S I O N
The preceding chapters have outlined how the 
DIFC Courts first emerged and then evolved into 
the institution they are today. The Introduction 
placed the DIFC Courts narrative into the larger 
literature of  foreign legal actors operating in this 
era of  globalisation. Also within this chapter, the 
argument was made that the oft-provided, binary 
description of  foreign legal actors being either the 
‘good guys’ or ‘bad guys’ was too simplistic and 
did not offer texture or nuance to what is more 
frequently a complicated story.
From there, Chapter One detailed the mechanics  
of  how the DIFC Courts came into existence. 
There was a focus on both the legislative and 
regulatory frameworks that helped establish the 
Courts, along with a discussion of  the visionaries 
who initiated the plans of  formation. This chapter 
also included an overview of  how the DIFC 
Courts are structured, and how there have been 
changes over time in their operation. It concluded 
with a discussion of  the Courts’ caseload and  
brief  biographies of  the judges who have served.
Chapter Two then moved into a two-part 
discussion. Part one focused on the evolution 
of  the Courts’ jurisprudence; part two 
concentrated on the high-stakes debate over 
the actual enforceability of  the judgments from 
the Courts. In terms of  the former, in the early 
years the Courts were restrained in how they 
addressed matters of  statutory and regulatory 
interpretation along with questions relating 
to their own jurisdictional authority. As time 
progressed, however, and the Courts gained more 
institutional maturity, this attitude shifted and 
led to greater boldness and a willingness to play 
a more expansive role both within and outside 
of  the Emirate. But as was explained, beginning 
in 2015, the Courts, sensing resistance, carefully 
and strategically scaled back this intentional, 
purposive approach. In terms of  the enforceability 
debate, extensive interview data from a range 
of  stakeholders were presented, followed by a 
powerful articulation from DIFC officials as  
to the significant advances that have been made  
on this front.
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Finally, Chapter Three offered a detailed analysis 
of  the events that have occurred since the 
government’s enactment of  Decree 19 in 2016. 
There was an examination of  the case law from 
the Judicial Tribunal (JT), which emerged in 
2016 and was tasked with resolving jurisdictional 
conflicts between the DIFC Courts and the local 
Dubai Courts. Initially, as was discussed, in Oger 
and Dubai World, the JT sided with the Dubai 
Courts. In response, the judges representing  
the DIFC Courts penned two respective dissents 
emphasising the importance of  considering the 
existing precedent that had interpreted DIFC 
law, Emirati law and international law, which 
they argued should have led to opposite results. 
However, as was also noted in Chapter Three, 
notwithstanding three other split decisions, in  
the majority of  matters heard by the JT, unanimity 
was reached by the judges, including in the last  
set of  crucial cases of  2017. Regarding these cases, 
for the JT, the facts, circumstances and contexts  
of  them were distinguishable from the decisions, 
for example, in Oger and Dubai Water. Therefore,  
a binary analysis on whether the JT has been 
starkly positive or starkly negative for the DIFC 
Courts is not likely to capture the full picture of 
the Tribunal’s actions or its jurisprudence.  
In other words, the story is complicated.
Moreover, as this book is being completed during 
the first quarter of  2018, it is too early to know 
whether the consensus-based approach that was 
witnessed at the end of  the last term will continue, 
or whether cases will split once again along the 
lines of  Oger, Dubai World or the three other  
non-unanimous rulings in 2017. This question 
may even be rendered moot in the months ahead. 
Several lawyers with whom I spoke stated that 
Decree 19 is soon likely to witness amendments. 
In fact, one of  Dubai’s most prestigious domestic 
firms, Al Tamimi & Company, published a careful 
evaluation of  the Decree and noted that while 
the original version offered some new ‘welcome 
requirements’ to the administration of  justice on 
commercial law matters, overall it still needed 
‘greater clarity’ in order for the legal system as a 
whole to ‘operate more efficiently ... ’1 Among the 
changes that were suggested by the firm (as well as 
by others with whom I spoke) were, first, providing 
an official English translation of  Decree 19 to the 
public. As of  this writing, the only such version of 
the law is in Arabic, which means that the DIFC 
Courts, foreign lawyers and foreign clients must 
rely on unofficial translations, which do not carry 
the same force of  law within the Emirate.2
In addition, Al Tamimi & Co. has noted that 
procedural ambiguities have been present within 
the Decree from the start. For example, when the 
Decree was passed, there was no mention of  how 
respondents were to be notified that a proceeding 
within the JT had been launched against them. 
Nor was there guidance on how and by what 
deadline respondents were to rebut such charges. 
Furthermore, it was uncertain as to whether, 
according to the Decree, the decisions of  the JT 
were to have prospective or retroactive effect. 
Various lawyers also worried that the language  
of  the Decree would enable parties to use the JT 
as an omnibus appellate forum, which then would 
allow for protracted delays—the exact opposite 
intention of  the Decree itself.3
As stated, plans for amending Decree 19 appear 
to be underway. One senior, prominent lawyer 
even noted to me that such changes were going 
to occur this year.4 The reason, according to this 
individual, was because future uncertainty or a 
lack of  consensus from the JT has the potential 
to spark unwanted consequences. Namely, 
Dubai wishes to remain a friendly environment 
for foreign investors. Furthermore, it is keen to 
consolidate the globalisation enterprise that it has 
worked so hard to build over the last two decades. 
In order to facilitate such continuity, the Emirate’s 
institutions, including the JT, want a clear remit 
on how best to accomplish this objective while  
also being able to maintain and uphold the rule  
of  law. Many of  the important stakeholders in  
this conversation have these goals in common,  
and they thus await word on what changes will  
be made to the Decree in the future.
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Assuming that Decree 19 is eventually reformed  
in the manner that the above advocates so wish, 
there is an even larger issue that confronts Dubai 
—namely, ensuring that its legal system is capable 
of  accommodating the opportunities, pressures 
and challenges that come with competing within a 
global economy. The Emirate is keen to make the 
case to the international investor community that 
the lawyers who work within it have the skills to 
service what can often be complicated demands of 
sophisticated clients, especially in front of  a global 
commercial court. The architects of  the DIFC 
Courts, from their inception, were keenly aware of 
this point. And so, perhaps not surprisingly, dating 
back to 2004, the Courts were engaged in more 
than just their ‘core responsibilities of  managing 
cases and issuing judgments.’5 The Courts’ framers 
believed that because Dubai did not have a formal 
bar association, it was incumbent to help nurture 
and develop its legal profession and broader legal 
ecosystem.
T H E  L E G A L  P RO F E S S I O N 
A N D  T H E  D I F C  C O U RT S ’ 
RO L E  I N  C R E A T I O N  O F 
T H E  A O L
In particular, during the first decade of  their 
existence, the Courts provided a series of 
‘ancillary services’6 to those working within 
the DIFC. These activities included legal aid 
to the needy, serving as a disciplinary body for 
lawyers, promoting professional responsibility to 
practitioners, conducting training and continuing 
legal educational programmes, and producing 
relevant literature pertaining to the DIFC 
Courts and DIFC law.7 As time progressed and 
the number of  cases entering the Courts was 
increasing, which limited the time that could 
be spent on those ancillary matters, there was 
growing consensus among Courts personnel that 
these services required further institutionalisation 
and administrative independence.8
In 2015, under the leadership of  Chief  Justice 
Hwang, a major change occurred. As eluded to  
in Chapter One, a year earlier, the Chief  Justice 
had received enhanced powers, under Dubai Law 
No. 7 of  2014 (amending Law No. 9 of  2004), 
which officially established a body known as 
the Dispute Resolution Authority (DRA). (Note: 
The DRA superseded what was formally called 
the DIFC Judicial Authority.) The DRA was to 
serve as the umbrella structure overseeing ‘a. the 
Centre’s Courts; the Arbitration Centre; and any 
other tribunals or ancillary bodies in accordance 
with Article 8(5)(b) of  this Law.’9 The Chief  Justice 
was also deemed to be the ‘Head’ of  the DRA, 
which allowed him to address issues relating to 
the operations of  the legal profession within the 
DIFC. In this capacity, Chief  Justice Hwang  
(in May of  2015) issued Dispute Resolution 
Authority Order No. 2, in which he declared:
‘By this Order, in my capacity as Head of  the 
DRA and Chief  Justice of  the DIFC Courts, 
I hereby transfer to the DIFC DRA Academy 
the following ancillary legal services currently 
provided by the DIFC Courts, namely: (i) the 
Pro Bono Programme; (ii) the Registration of 
Practitioners and observance of  the DIFC  
Courts Mandatory Code of  Conduct and the 
DIFC Courts Code of  Best Legal Professional 
Practice; (iii) all current DIFC Courts training 
programmes such as the DIFC Courts Certificate 
in Laws and Procedures, Advocacy Training, 
Lecture Series and Arabic Language Seminars 
on the Laws and Practices of  the DIFC Courts; 
(iv) the publication of  DIFC Courts related 
literature such as the DIFC Courts Rules (RDC), 
legal textbooks and articles, Law Reports and 
newsletters; (v) the Education Sub-Committee 
(ESC); and (vi) the Annual Legal Gala Dinner,  
as well as other networking events between DIFC 
Courts and members of  the legal profession. 
The DRA Academy will act as an independent 
entity separate from the Courts. 
The main aims and activities of  the DRA 
Academy shall include but not be limited to: the 
dissemination of  information and provision of 
training on DIFC Courts Laws and Procedures; 
the registration of  practitioners before the DIFC 
Courts and the promotion and maintenance of 
access to justice and legal professional ethics;  
and the hosting of  events for the benefit of  the  
legal community.’10
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The Chief  Justice’s vision of  the DRA Academy—
that also has become known as the Academy 
of  Law (AOL)—was positively influenced 
by his experiences in Singapore. There, the 
Singapore Academy of  Law had emerged as a 
statutorily-created body with the goal ‘to build 
up the intellectual capital of  the [country’s] 
legal profession by enhancing legal knowledge, 
rais[ing] the international profile of  Singapore 
law, promot[ing] Singapore as a centre for 
dispute resolution, and improv[ing] the standards 
and	efficiency	of 	legal	practice	through	continuing	
professional development and the use of  technology.’11
The aspirations of  the AOL were similar. As 
David Gallo, Director of  the AOL has stated, 
there are multiple goals of  this organisation. To 
begin, the AOL is centred on operationalising the 
Chief  Justice’s above-stated directive by working 
on three main areas: Learning and Development 
(L&D); Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); and 
Legal System Development (LSD). Under L&D, 
there is a two-prong focus: a). an emphasis on the 
publication of  practice-oriented literature; and 
b). the teaching of  lawyers on how to enhance 
cross- jurisdictional legal knowledge. For the 
CSR and LSD areas, three objectives are priorities: 
a). registering and regulating DIFC Courts’ 
practitioners; b). providing pro bono legal services; 
and c). fostering networking opportunities that 
allow for the ‘shar[ing] of  professional knowledge’ 
among participating stakeholders.12
Consider that in two years (2016 and 2017), and 
with just a five-member staff  (including Gallo), 
there has been a wide range of  activities. For 
example, the AOL has a register of  over eighty law 
firms and approximately 285 individual lawyers. 
There have been intensive training sessions on the 
common law to Emirati lawyers, which Gallo sees 
as a productive way to engage the domestic bar. 
Conversely, the AOL has held seminars on civil 
law practice for foreign common law lawyers 
unfamiliar with this system. Approximately 100 
separate educational events have been held with 
nearly 2,000 total participants attending. The 
AOL has facilitated pro bono legal clinics with 
over 150 lawyers participating, which have helped 
around 1,200 people. And various publications 
have been issued, such as legal commentaries, 
court reports, and court rules.
Relatedly, there has been an array of  partnerships 
with institutions such as City University of 
London, American University in the Emirates, 
New York University and Middlesex University, 
along with collaborations with the Dubai 
Legal Affairs Department. These relationships 
have promoted continuing legal education for 
practitioners as well as courses for law students 
that emphasise global legal practice. Included 
as part of  these initiatives is a special AOL-
coordinated course hosted by the American 
company Barbri, which prepares enrolees to take 
the California and New York bar exams. (Thus 
far, forty-four students have registered for this 
course.) And the AOL is working with Barbri 
International, London, along with the Law 
Society of  England and Wales and the Solicitors 
Regulatory Authority, on a plan that would 
eventually permit lawyers from the Emirate and 
other Gulf  Cooperation Council states to qualify 
as English solicitors.13
Finally, in an effort to provide further dispute 
resolution services and varied types of  assistance 
to the community, the AOL has also sought 
to serve two other units that were created: the 
Arbitration Institute and the Wills and Probate 
Registry.14 Regarding the former, a bit of 
background is perhaps required. In 2008, the 
DIFC established a joint venture with the London 
Court of  International Arbitration (LCIA) within 
its campus. Over the years, this DIFC-LCIA office 
saw its workload stagnate, to the point where up 
until 2014 it could almost be viewed as moribund. 
Since November 2015, the Arbitration Institute 
has been in charge of  ‘the management and 
administration of  arbitrations in which the parties 
had selected DIFC-LCIA Rules, [effectively] ... 
leading to the relaunch of  DIFC-LCIA.’15 The 
result has been that ‘[t]he case load of  the DIFC-
LCIA has seen a significant surge in the past 12 
months.’16
In terms of  the DIFC Wills and Probate Registry 
(now known as the Wills Service Centre), this 
office ‘was established to provide non-Muslims 
with assets and/or children in Dubai with the 
option to choose the DIFC Courts through 
which to enforce their inheritance wishes as an 
alternative to other judicial routes.’17 Since the 
Registry has only been in operation for less than 
two years, it is difficult to know how this office 
will perform in the long-term, but the aspirations 
are high as indicated by the hiring of  a former 
Clifford Chance solicitor, Sean Hird, as its 
Director.18 In fact, according to Hird, there were 
already 1,245 registrations filed with the office in 
2016 and 1,481 in 2017.19
Both these initiatives highlight an overarching 
theme that traces its roots back to the founding 
of  the DIFC Courts. Recall, the Courts were 
originally established to help attract foreigners 
to invest in Dubai. If  there was going to be a 
surge of  commercial interest, the theory was 
that there needed to be a stable, transparent 
judicial institution that would adhere to rule of 
law standards upon which these investors could 
feel secure. The AOL’s work with the Arbitration 
Institute and Wills Service Centre, therefore, is 
simply an extension of  this idea, whereby services 
are provided—whether in the form of  providing 
legal education on alternative dispute resolution, 
instilling confidence in the probate process, or 
developing commentaries on laws—so that legal 
professionals are equipped with the necessary skills 
to carry out the overall mission of  the Academy.
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Thus, it is clear that the goal of  the AOL—and 
the DIFC Courts before it—has been to educate 
and train students and lawyers to be globally 
sophisticated actors who can participate in Dubai’s 
growth as an economic hub for the region and 
beyond. The theory under which the leaders of 
the AOL are working relates back to parts of  the 
literature discussed in the Introduction—namely 
that where there are professionals in a country 
who promote a legal system that values open 
borders, globalisation, transparency and the rule 
of  law, commercial growth for that country will 
likely follow. As such, reforming Decree 19 is only 
one part of  the equation for those who are hoping 
that Dubai will remain a key destination for the 
international investor community. Developing and 
maintaining a sound legal profession—that has 
its roots in the principles that are promoted by the 
AOL—is another central aspect of  this process. 
Fortunately, the early signs are positive (and the 
efforts are certainly sincere) that this body has 
made a substantive impact thus far.
Mark Beer, Registrar General of DIFC Courts, HE Essa Kazim, 
Governor of DIFC, Chief Justice Michael Hwang SC, DIFC Courts,  
and HH Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, Chairman and  
Chief Executive of Emirates Group, open the DIFC Dispute Resolution 
Authority in 2015. 
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The DIFC Courts experiment has spawned other 
jurisdictions—both within and outside the UAE—
to consider whether they too should establish 
global commercial courts of  their own. It is worth 
noting that in 2015 the ‘Abu Dhabi Global Market 
Courts’ (ADGM) were built within a campus 
similar to that of  the DIFC’s.20 These ADGM 
Courts are: 
‘broadly modelled on the English judicial system 
... [Furthermore], [t]he foundation of  the civil 
and commercial law in [the] ADGM is provided 
by the Application of  English Law Regulations 
2015. Those Regulations make English common 
law (including the rules and principles of  equity) 
directly applicable in [the] ADGM. In addition, 
a wide ranging set of  well-established English 
statutes on civil matters are also made applicable 
in [the] ADGM.’21
I M P L I C AT I O N S :  
W H AT  L I E S  A H E A D
Conclusion
The ADGM Courts are relatively new and the 
number of  judgments posted on their website, 
from either the Court of  First Instance or Court 
of  Appeal level, is limited. But the personnel of 
the Courts are impressive. The Right Honourable 
Lord David Hope sits as the Chief  Justice, which 
has been seen as a noteworthy appointment 
because of  his decades of  experience in the UK 
as a lawyer, judge and Member of  Parliament.22 
Alongside Lord Hope are seven other judges who 
have worked in jurisdictions including England, 
Scotland, Hong Kong, Australia and New 
Zealand.23 And the Registrar of  the ADGM Courts 
is Linda Fitz-Alan who was appointed in 2015. 
She hails from Australia where she previously held 
the position of  CEO and Principal Registrar of 
the New South Wales Supreme Court. (Before that 
posting, she was a respected private practitioner 
in Sydney.)24 As the years progress, it will be 
interesting to see how the ADGM Courts develop 
and what the parallels, similarities, and differences 
are with the DIFC Courts.
Then there has been another international 
commercial court that has sprung-up in Chief 
Justice Hwang’s home jurisdiction, Singapore, 
which established its forum under the Singapore 
High Court in 2015.25 Other jurisdictions are 
contemplating doing the same—including 
in Australia, Belgium, China (with three 
international commercial courts of  their own 
being developed), France, the Netherlands and 
Kazakhstan.26 Indeed, 2018 will mark the official 
opening of  both the Netherlands Commercial Court 
and the Astana International Financial Centre Court 
(AIFCC). With the former, the plan is to operate 
in English while using Dutch procedural law. 
The theory is that such a combined approach 
has the benefits of  employing the lingua franca 
of  ‘global commercial business’ with the ease of 
relying on civil law remedies that ‘can be quite 
difficult to secure in English speaking common law 
jurisdictions.’27 As for the AIFCC, interestingly it 
will have Lord Harry Woolf  from the UK serving 
as its first Chairman and Chief  Justice,28 and he 
‘will be joined by eight others [from the UK] 
to run the first commercial court of  its type in 
Eurasia.’29
With all of  these developments, what impact  
might there be on the longer-standing commercial 
courts that have existed in places such as Delaware 
(US), New York (i.e. the commercial division  
of  the Supreme Court of  New York), London,  
Hong Kong and New South Wales? It seems  
hard to believe that given their reputation, the 
older, more established commercial courts will  
be substantively or adversely affected, in terms of  
the amount of  cases they see coming before them. 
Yet can the same be said for the DIFC Courts? 
What might this new competition mean for them? 
Then consider another set of  important 
developments. 2018 will mark the retirement 
of  both Chief  Justice Hwang and Deputy Chief 
Justice Sir David Steel. The Chief  Executive of 
the DIFC Courts, Mark Beer, has announced his 
departure as well. There are those who believe 
that the time has come for the Courts to be led  
by Emiratis. After all, the DIFC is within the 
Emirate, is subject to the governance structure 
of  Dubai, and has a judiciary that is supposed 
to be part and parcel of  the Dubai court 
system. Furthermore, both the legal and judicial 
professions within Dubai today have within them 
individuals who are internationally sophisticated 
and who have received training (often from the 
AOL) on the civil and common law. Therefore, 
as this argument goes, it is only natural that after 
being in existence for well over a decade the 
Courts should have Emiratis in charge. For those 
in support of  this position, it is ultimately a matter of 
sovereignty. While the Dubai government respects, 
values and welcomes those from other countries, 
there is a feeling among some that a better 
balance must be struck so that the Emirate can 
remain strongly independent, prosper and, in this 
situation, administer its own judicial affairs with 
its own citizens leading the way.
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Not surprisingly, there is a counter to this argument—
from	not	just	foreigners	but	from	various	local	
stakeholders as well. To begin, Dubai has long  
had judges and staff  from other jurisdictions 
(mainly Arabic-speaking countries) who have 
served in its judiciary. More specifically, the 
foreign professionals of  the DIFC Courts never 
entered Dubai in an effort to exert domination. 
Instead, from the start and throughout the 
process, they were, and continue to be, invited. 
Furthermore, these actors have sought to work 
cooperatively with the Dubai government in order  
to establish and consolidate the DIFC Courts into  
a globally respected institution.
According to this perspective, it is also important 
not to forget that Dubai has only recently begun to 
recover from the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. 
These advocates claim that having Dubai’s global 
commercial courts continue to be staffed with 
highly reputed, experienced professionals who are 
intimately familiar with English commercial law 
is essential for there to be stability in the system. 
Additionally, judges from abroad provide judicial 
independence and the necessary assurance to 
international investors that Dubai will stay true 
to its commitment on those protocols to which the 
UAE has signed—especially as it relates to the 
recognition and enforcement of  foreign judgments 
and foreign arbitral awards.
So to reiterate, what then is the future of  the DIFC 
Courts? Jurisdictions contemplating establishing 
their own commercial courts are astutely watching 
the events in Dubai to see how developments will 
play out, as well as for lessons that they can apply 
to their own respective contexts. To be sure, the 
framers who imagined and boldly established 
the Courts clearly deserve commendation, and it 
would be unfortunate if  all of  the good work that 
has been done to date does not continue well 
into the future. Of  course, as we have seen, there 
have been various challenges that have emerged 
over the years. And new ones certainly are to 
follow. How the Courts—and the other important, 
relevant stakeholders—respond to existing and 
future hurdles will likely determine what becomes 
of  this institution. Otherwise put, until we know 
what exactly will transpire over the next few years 
regarding the DIFC Courts, this story cannot yet 
be fully completed. For now, therefore, we will 
simply have to wait and see.
Mark Beer, Registrar General of DIFC Courts
HE Justice Ali Shamis Al Madhani (UAE), Justice Roger Giles (Australia), former Deputy Chief 
Justice Sir David Steel (England and Wales), HE Justice Omar Juma Al Muhairi (UAE), Chief 
Justice Michael Hwang SC (Singapore), former Deputy Chief Justice John Chadwick (England and 
Wales), Justice Tun Zaki bin Azmi (Malaysia), Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke (England and Wales), 
Justice Sir Richard Field (England and Wales) and HE Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi (UAE).
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